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This dissertation investigates the impact of institutional and governance factors on the 
performance of 10 selected smallholder agricultural cooperatives (case studies) in KwaZulu-
Natal (KZN). All the selected cooperatives were traditionally structured (e.g., one-member, 
one-vote system). Due to logistical and administrative constraints, the selected smallholder 
cooperatives were drawn from the EThekwini and UMgungundlovu Districts (the latter 
comprising of two sub-districts, namely Camperdown and Msunduzi), which incorporate the 
major cities of Durban and Pietermaritzburg. Five of the cooperatives grow and market 
vegetables, three produce and market poultry, one is a beef production cooperative and 
another operates a bakery. 
 
Information from the interviews suggests that members of the selected smallholder 
cooperatives do not fully understand cooperative principles and have high expectations of 
potential benefits of being members. Descriptive analysis of the case studies describes total 
membership of each selected cooperative; average number of management meetings per 
month; gender and age composition of cooperative members; the characteristics of 
chairpersons of these cooperatives (e.g., gender, age and education); the initial capital 
structure of these cooperatives; annual turnover; growth opportunities; and institutional and 
governance factors influencing the performance of these cooperatives.  
 
The results of a cluster analysis suggest that the performance of the selected smallholder 
cooperatives is influenced by institutional and governance problems. Institutional problems 
give rise to low levels of equity and debt capital, re iance on government funding, low levels 
of investment, and subsequent loss of members. Governance problems are strongly linked to 
the absence of secret ballot, low levels of education, lack of production and management skills 
training, weak marketing arrangements and consequent low returns to members as patrons or 
investors. The conclusion is that appropriate institutional arrangements and good governance 
are important to the performance of enterprises initiated by groups of smallholders. South 
Africa’s new Cooperatives Act prevents smallholder cooperatives from adopting good 
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Smallholders are the potential drivers of agricultural development in less-developed regions 
(Machethe, 1990). Delgado (1999:165) argues that “Smallholder agriculture is simply too 
important to employment, human welfare, and political stability in sub-Saharan Africa to be 
either ignored or treated as just another small adjusting sector of a market economy ….” 
Governments in less-developed countries have often promoted the use of cooperatives as 
organisations that could enhance the development of their small-scale farmers. Since 1994, the 
new democratic government in South Africa has been supporting the growth of cooperatives, 
especially among historically disadvantaged South Africans, as a strategy to alleviate poverty 
and create jobs. This government did not consider th  Cooperatives Act of 1981 as a suitable 
vehicle for the development of cooperatives in the new economic and political era, and 
initiated a process of developing a new Act based on international cooperative principles. The 
new Cooperatives Act (No. 14 of 2005), under which a variety of cooperatives can register, 
was signed into law in August 2005. This Act recognizes the cooperative values (such as self-
help, self-reliance, self-responsibility and democracy) and argues that a viable, autonomous, 
self-reliant and self-sustaining cooperative movement can play a major role in the economic 
and social development of the country, particularly among the previously disadvantaged 
people (Government Gazette, 2005). However, the new legislation perpetuates the notion of 
traditional cooperatives (TCs), ignoring trends in developed countries where cooperative 
legislation has been amended to encourage investment by patron and non-patron members 
(Lyne and Collins, 2008). 
 
A traditional cooperative (TC) is an organisation formed by a group of people who meet 
voluntarily to fulfil mutual economic and social needs through running a democratically 
controlled enterprise such that the benefits achieved through cooperation are greater than the 
benefits achieved individually (ICA, 2005). Some analysts argue that cooperatives have 
significant potential to contribute towards reducing poverty, enhancing empowerment and 
creating employment (Barton, 1989; Philip, 2003; Van Niekerk, 1988). However, several 
factors have hindered the performance of smallholder cooperatives in developing countries. 






homelands of South Africa suggests that members did not clearly understand the purpose of a 
cooperative, their obligations and rights, or how to manage their business. Cooperatives’ 
failure to provide transport for delivery of members’ purchases, lack of membership identity 
with their cooperatives, and lack of understanding of members’ roles were contributory 
factors. This could have resulted from members’ ignora ce, a lack of education and skills 
training and/or poor extension advice (Machethe, 1990).  
 
Van der Walt’s (2005) study on cooperative failures in Limpopo province indicated that poor 
management, lack of training, conflict among members (due mainly to poor service delivery), 
and lack of funds were important contributory factors. Other authors (Van Niekerk, 1988; 
Barratt, 1989:2; Kherallah and Kirsten, 2002; Anderson and Henehan, 2003) highlighted 
access to start-up capital; experience and training in business management, marketing and 
accounting; levels of literacy; attitudes towards work; and the degree of cooperative 
community ethos as factors contributing to cooperative performance. Weak institutions (e.g., 
ill-defined property rights), inadequate capital, deficient support systems such as external 
monitoring and evaluation, and lack of a supportive policy environment have also contributed 
to cooperative failures (Lyne and Collins, 2008; Zulu, 2007).  Ill-defined property rights, 
according to agency theory, give rise to a set of pr blems that undermine the efficiency of 
traditional cooperatives (TCs) in risky and differentiated markets (Kyriakopoulos, 2000). This 
study focuses on the effects of institutional and governance factors on the performance of 
selected smallholder agricultural cooperatives in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). The study is 
important because it builds on previous work that highlights the importance of resolving 
institutional and governance problems in TCs (Cook, 1995:1159; Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000) 
and ways in which South Africa’s cooperative legislation could be amended to mitigate these 
problems (Lyne and Collins, 2008). 
 
According to the 2005/6 report of the South African (SA) Registrar of Cooperatives, 511 new 
cooperatives were registered during the financial year 2004/5. In the 2005/6 financial year 
2829 cooperatives were registered in South Africa – n increase of 454%. The number of 
registered agricultural cooperatives increased by 79% from 256 in 2001 to 459 in 2004 
(CIPRO, 2006). KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) recorded 57 new agricultural cooperatives in the year 






it is difficult to establish how many of the registered cooperatives are actually active and 
thriving. Some of the smallholder cooperatives have registered but are not operating at all. 
According to the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs 
(KZNDAEA), some of the associated factors that have contributed to this include: lack of 
proper co-ordination between cooperative members; poor financial support such as provision 
of equity and debt capital; lack of markets; no mentorship, monitoring and evaluation 
programmes; and lack of entrepreneurial skills (Zulu, 2007). Therefore, there is a need to 
better understand the factors that have inhibited th  growth and performance of smallholder 
agricultural cooperatives in KZN. 
 
The cooperative as a business form exists to provide a service to its members, who retain 
influence over cooperative functions and activities. They can reduce costs, enhance incomes, 
and improve the viability of business activities, and thus have potential to contribute towards 
reducing poverty, enhancing empowerment and creating employment (Philip, 2003). The 
International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) is an independent, non-governmental organization 
(NGO) which unites, represents and serves cooperativ s worldwide. According to the ICA 
(2005), cooperatives are significant economic and social actors. Barton (1989) agrees that 
agricultural cooperatives provide significant economic incentives which include achieving 
more favourable prices, patronage refunds, providing services which would not be available 
otherwise, or to secure sources of inputs and access to certain markets.  
 
The aim of this study is to gain a better understanding of the characteristics of smallholder 
agricultural cooperatives in KZN and to identify institutional and governance constraints 
affecting their performance through in-depth analysis of 10 case studies. Identifying 
performance constraints is important if cooperative development is to be achieved in the 
future.  
 
This dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 1 reviews the relevant literature on the 
concept of agricultural cooperatives, the principles they are guided by, and their history. It 
then focuses on the classification and rationale for the cooperative business as identified by the 
literature. Chapter 2 addresses the factors influencing the performance of cooperatives. 






the performance of selected smallholder cooperatives in KwaZulu-Natal. Chapter 4 describes 
the case studies and their characteristics. Qualitative nd quantitative results of the study are 









REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERAT IVES 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
In order to understand the concept of performance of smallholder cooperatives, it is imperative 
to first understand how cooperatives developed. Hence, this chapter focuses on a review of the 
literature on the development of cooperatives. This c apter is presented in four sections: the 
first section gives an overview of cooperative definitions and principles, and the second 
section provides an overview of the origin of agricultural cooperatives. The role of agricultural 
cooperatives and a comparison of cooperatives with other forms of businesses are presented in 
the third and fourth sections respectively.  
1.2 Definitions and principles of a cooperative 
 
Review of the literature on agricultural cooperatives yields numerous definitions of 
cooperatives (McBride, 1986; Porter and Scully, 1987; Nilsson, 1997). The legal definitions of 
a cooperative vary depending upon the source, but mos agree that a traditional cooperative is 
one that: (1) provides service at cost; (2) is democratically controlled by its member-patrons; 
and (3) limits returns on equity capital (McBride, 1986:93). The owners of a cooperative are 
the same people who have access to the services it offers. Knapp (1962:476) defines a 
cooperative as “a special type of business corporation serving those who are at the same time 
both owners and users of its services”. Porter and Scully (1987:494) define cooperatives as 
“voluntary closed organizations in which the decision-control and risk-bearing functions 
repose in the membership, and decision management reposes in the agent (manager), who 
represents the principal’s interests”. Le Vay (1983) states that the basic blocks in defining a 
cooperative are that it is an association of persons (either individually or institutions) who 
work together to achieve certain commercial objectiv s. According to Rhodes (1983), a 
cooperative is a special type of business firm owned and operated for mutual benefit by the 






most cooperative definitions, namely: (1) cooperation s an economic activity; (2) it is 
conducted for the need of its members; and (3) it is owned and controlled by these members.  
 
The International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) defines a cooperative as “an autonomous 
association of persons united voluntarily to meet th ir common economic, social and cultural 
needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise” (ICA, 
2005). According to the National Cooperative Busines Association (NCBA, 2007), people 
form cooperatives to exploit new market and economic opportunities through self-help; 
provide themselves with services that would not have otherwise been available if provided 
individually; to strengthen bargaining power; maint access to competitive markets; acquire 
needed products and services on a competitive basis; reduce costs; and manage risk.  Hence, 
cooperatives exist to serve the interests of their m mbers. Essentially, then, a cooperative is an 
organisation formed by a group of people who meet voluntarily to fulfil mutual economic and 
social needs through running a democratically controlled enterprise such that the benefits 
achieved through cooperation are greater than the ben fits achieved individually (McBride, 
1986; Nilsson, 1997; Krivokapic-Skoko, 2002; ICA, 2005; NCBA, 2007). 
 
The social, moral and economic considerations which motivated the first Cooperative 
Societies of Europe in 1844 are still relevant to mst cooperatives today (Zeuli and Cropp, 
1980). The Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers first set out the Cooperative principles in 
1844. They began by opening a cooperative store that sold items such as flour and sugar to 
members, and the society quickly expanded into other enterprises (Zeuli and Cropp, 1980; 
Ortmann and King, 2007a). Presently, cooperative businesses are owned by the members they 
serve; hence, like all forms of business undertakings, they are guided by a set of principles 
(see Appendix 1). The adoption of these principles en ures that the organisation’s primary 
objectives is one of member service, rather than one of long term profit maximization as in a 
non-cooperative business. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) incorporated 
three basic cooperative principles in their governme t regulations. These are: (1) the user-
owner principle: persons who own and finance the cooperative are those who use it; (2) the 
user-control principle: control of the cooperatives is by those who use the cooperatives; and 
(3) the user-benefit principle: benefits of the cooperative are distributed to its users on the 






The first three principles specifying openness, democratic control and the source and 
management of capital, are fundamental ones and have remained constant with the ICA 
principles. Modern cooperatives reward investors – including external investors in some cases 
– with dividends, capital gains and even voting rights. These company-like institutional 
arrangements are not consistent with the principles underpinning traditional cooperatives. 
Agricultural cooperatives are pursuing new generation cooperatives because investment 
constraints arise as a result of free rider, horizon and portfolio problems (Chaddad and Cook, 
2004).  
1.2.1 Cooperative typology  
 
In addition to traditional cooperatives, Chaddad an Cook (2004) introduced an ownership 
rights typology of five non-traditional forms of cooperative. These include proportional 
investment cooperatives, member-investor cooperatives, new generation cooperatives (NGCs), 
cooperatives with capital seeking components, and investor share cooperatives. The five non-
traditional cooperative types can be characterised a  follows: 
1. Proportional investment cooperatives – differ from traditional cooperatives in that 
owner-patrons are required to invest in proportion o their patronage; 
2. Member-investor cooperatives – owner-patrons receive returns in proportion to both 
patronage and investment, with their dividend payments in proportion to shareholding, 
or by allowing appreciable share values; 
3. New-generation cooperatives – ownership rights remain restricted to owner patrons, 
and in fact to specific owner-patrons, but are both appreciable and transferable. In 
addition, owner-patrons are required to patronise the cooperative in proportion to their 
investment; 
4. Cooperatives with capital seeking components – allow non-patron equity participation, 
enabling access to outside capital, but restrict this participation to be via subsidiary 
companies, strategic alliances, etc., rather than investing directly in a cooperative; and; 
5. Investor-share cooperatives – allow direct non-patron equity participation in the 
cooperative itself, usually involving the issuance of multiple classes of financial 






1.3 Origin of agricultural cooperatives 
 
The history of agricultural cooperatives dates back more than 150 years. Cooperative 
businesses are now found in almost all continents of he world, from the developing nations of 
Africa, Asia, and South America to the industrial countries of Europe and North America. 
Northern Europe (where the cooperative movement originated) has a strong cooperative 
presence in agriculture (Zeuli and Cropp, 1980). Traditionally, many cooperatives focused on 
three main areas of business: (1) the purchase and s le of agricultural inputs and equipment; 
(2) the purchase, storage and subsequent sale of agricultural commodities; and (3) transport 
services (Piesse t al., 2003; cited by Ortmann and King, 2007a). The prima y objective of the 
first cooperative systems was aimed at assisting the participants to overcome their greatest 
obstacle to economic self-sufficiency; namely, their effective isolation from their routine of 
wage labour through the development of economic activity (Barratt, 1989). The evolution of 
cooperatives in developed and developing countries will be discussed next, with a focus 
around Europe, the United States and South Africa. 
1.3.1 Cooperatives in developed countries 
 
Modern cooperatives originated in Europe in the late 19th century, during the Industrial 
Revolution (Hoyt, 1989; cited by Ortmann and King, 2007a). These cooperatives were seen as 
social and economic alternatives to the impacts of emergent industrial capitalism (Philip, 
2003). While some cooperatives have failed, others ave survived for many years and are 
successful. According to Philip (2003), cooperatives grew within five distinct traditions: the 
consumer cooperatives, established in England by a group of workers popularly known as the 
Rochdale Pioneers; the worker cooperatives, whose early stablishment was in France; the 
credit cooperatives, which largely began in Germany; the agricultural cooperatives, which 
were first established in Denmark, Spain, Poland an Germany; and, finally, service 
cooperatives, such as housing and health cooperativs, which emerged in many parts of 
industrial Europe by the end of the 19th century. Table 1.1 shows some of the earliest record d 








Table 1.1: Earliest recorded cooperatives in selected developed countries 





































Source: (Ingalsbe and Groves, 1989; cited by Ortmann and King, 2006) 
 
The Industrial Revolution in the late 18th and early 19th centuries brought about profound 
effects on the way business was organized. The working conditions and economic situations of 
many people led to the formation of the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers in England in 
1844 (ARDI, 2003). The Rochdale Pioneers was a group f workers representing various 
trades who formulated a set of basic operating rules based on a two-year study of cooperatives, 
including some that were not successful (Ortmann and Ki g, 2007a). Among these rules were: 
democratic control of members; payment of limited interest on capital; and net margins 
distributed to members according to level of patronage. The Rochdale set of policies soon 
became a model for other cooperatives and have become t  be known as the general principles 
that differentiates cooperatives from other business structures. The Rochdale cooperative 
objectives were to address their members’ needs, such as better housing, employment, food, 
education and other social needs.  
 
The history of cooperatives in China dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century 






1920s and early 1930s the Chinese nationalist governm nt began to promote many rural credit 
cooperatives. However, the development of farmer cooperatives in China is still at an early 
stage. Hu et al. (2006) state that the organization and strategy of farmer specialized 
cooperatives in China are deeply influenced by the institutional environment. In the United 
States (U.S.), one of the earliest cooperatives was established in 1752 by Benjamin Franklin 
and is still in operation today, namely the Philadephia Contributorship for the Insurance of 
Houses from Losses by Fire (Van Niekerk, 1988:6). Most agricultural cooperatives in the U.S. 
originated in the early 1900’s due to economic, farm organisation, and public policy factors 
(Cook, 1995). Cooperatives were formed mainly for two reasons, namely: a) individual 
producers needed institutional mechanisms to bring economic balance under their control, 
usually because of excess supply-induced prices; thi  was particularly the case immediately 
following World War I, when an agricultural depression was severe; and b) individual 
producers needed institutional mechanisms to countervail opportunism and hold-up situations 
which were common in the late 1800’s and early 1900’s in the U.S. (Cook, 1995). Most U.S. 
agricultural producers worked collectively for defensive purposes – to depressed prices and/or 
market failure. About 12 000 agricultural cooperatives were formed in the subsequent ten 
years. History shows that successful cooperatives often evolve in institutional structure to 
become more similar to investor-owned firms over time (Cook, 1995). Restrictive legislation 
or tax benefits afforded to cooperatives can restrain his natural evolution. 
1.3.2 Cooperatives in developing countries 
 
Cooperative movements have endured and thrived in ma y African countries that are still 
developing. Most agricultural cooperatives in the developing countries focus more on product 
marketing and input supply as opposed to production (Ortmann and King, 2006). The 
introduction of cooperatives to English speaking African countries was based on the 
experience gained by the British colonial administration in Asia. African farmers grew crops 
such as coffee, cocoa, cotton, peanuts and rice. Th British colonial system marked the 
enactment of cooperative legislation, which also provided for the establishment of a 
cooperative union and the appointment of a Registrar of Cooperative Societies. According to 
Machethe (1990), the majority of people in less-developed countries (LDCs) live in the rural 
areas and survive on a low income earned through subsistence agriculture. In the case of South 






promoting agricultural development. Machethe (1990) mentions some of the reasons as lack of 
membership identity with their cooperatives, lack of understanding cooperative principles, and 
the inability of members to dismiss inefficient management.  
 
The history of cooperatives in South Africa dates back to late 19th century, when Natal was the 
first province to establish commercial farm cooperatives in 1892. These were the 
Pietermaritzburg Cooperative Society and the Natal Creamery Limited. In 1908, the South 
African Cooperatives Act was formulated (Barratt, 1989:8). The first cooperative in the 
Orange Free State was only established in 1911. The dev lopment of agricultural cooperatives 
in South Africa was characterised by periods of distress with the accompanying government 
support (Smith, 1979). These periods included the Anglo-Boer War and the Great Depression. 
Many cooperatives in South Africa were only established after the end of the Anglo-Boer war 
when commercial farmers, whose livelihoods had been displaced by their long absences from 
the land, lacked start-up capital.  The government established the Land and Agricultural Bank 
of South Africa in 1912 to provide loans to farmers. This led to agricultural cooperatives 
reaching a high turnover of R549 million in 1958 (Barratt, 1989:8).  
 
The Land and Agricultural Bank, formed in 1912, absor ed the provincial banks of the 
Transvaal and the Orange Free State Societies with unlimited liability and cooperative 
“companies” with limited liability increased (Strickland, 1937). This increase only became 
rapid after 1922 when the Cooperative Societies Act for the entire Union was implemented. 
The history of black people’s cooperative enterprise in South Africa has until recently been 
very limited, and is largely restricted to credit unions - the first formal example of which was 
registered in 1928.  
 
SA farmers are faced with a dynamic global economic and trade environment caused by the 
liberalisation of international markets. In addition, there has been a rapid advance in 
information and communication technologies (Ortmann, 2005). The agri-food industry has 
been rapidly changing and globalising and, hence, some agricultural cooperatives have 
responded by forming subsidiaries co-owned by external investors or opening up their own 
societies to investment by non-farmer interests, while other agricultural cooperatives have 






cases farmers are determined to keep control of their core business. A typical example is 
Clover Industries Limited (CIL) that has grown from a Creamery in Natal to a large SA 
organization (Clover S.A., 2007). The Natal Creamery Ltd was changed to National Co-
operative Dairies Limited (NCD) in 1943 when its mebers approved the cooperative-style 
system. In 1994 Clover S.A. (Pty) Ltd was established as an operational company by NCD and 
during 1997 Clover Holdings Limited was formed to act s a holding company for Clover. In 
2003 NCD was converted from a cooperative to a public company to raise capital and to 
access the value of the business as a going concern. Clover Holdings Limited was unbundled 
in 2004 and at present CIL is the holding company of Cl ver S.A., South Africa's largest dairy 
company and one of the leading manufacturers and marketers of food products in southern 
Africa (Clover S.A., 2007).   
1.4 The role of agricultural cooperatives 
 
Agricultural cooperatives have been promoted in many less-developed countries (LDCs) as 
instruments of nurturing agricultural development. In the SADC region, agricultural 
cooperatives are considered important for providing services (e.g., market access, extension) 
to small-scale farmers and agribusinesses that contribute to poverty reduction and economic 
development. For example, in South Africa, cooperatives in the past dominated the 
distribution of agricultural inputs and intermediates such as seed, fertilizer, fuel and repair 
services. The establishment of cooperatives can result in various advantages for their 
members. Cooperatives can supply services to their m mbers which other suppliers are 
unwilling to do. They can increase the bargaining power of individuals enabling them to 
obtain services and products at more favourable prices. Von Ravensburg (1999:6), as cited by 
Van der Walt (2005), adds that bargaining power obtained not only contributed to the goals of 
individuals, but that the forming of cooperatives can also contribute to the alleviation of 
poverty, especially amongst the less privileged communities. Bhuyan and Olson (1998:7) 
consider the cooperative an ideal type of business to concentrate on as it contributes to the 
socio-economic needs of its members. In rural communities, the cooperative can play an 
important role as the economic engine for creating jobs and increasing rural income (Van, der 






Whilst some authors such as Nilsson (2001) and Hakelius (1996) underline the economic role 
of cooperatives (e.g., establishing new markets, vertical integration) and their competitive 
advantage, others stress their role as part of the social economy (such as influencing 
governmental policy and production cooperatives as a stabilizing factor in the labour market) 
(Bouckova, 2002). According to Lyne and Collins (2008:180), “agricultural cooperatives are 
often viewed as appropriate vehicles to facilitate vertical coordination with, or horizontal 
integration between, small farmers who would have been excluded from value-adding 
opportunities and discerning markets”. Agricultural cooperatives have allowed people to 
achieve objectives such as provision of credit, management techniques and supply of 
production inputs relatively cheaply and on time which was not feasible if they had acted 
individually (Machethe and Van Rooyen, 1983). According to Gertler (2001:8), "Cooperatives 
and collective ownership schemes are important vehicles to meet the economic goals of 
development, broad individual empowerment, and sustainable livelihoods for communities".  
Koller (1947) argues that the primary role of cooperatives is to overcome some of the defects 
and limitations of the capitalistic economy. These include imperfections in the competitive 
process, which interfere with the free allocation of resources in accordance with consumer 
preferences. Cooperatives improve competitiveness of a group and enlarge the area in which 
the competitive pricing mechanism is effective. Barton (1989) agrees that agricultural 
producers have significant economic incentives to form cooperatives to generate benefits for 
members. These include negotiating patronage refunds, or to secure sources of supply and 
access to certain markets or to vertically integrate in o processing plants (specific assets) that 
are too big for individual farmers to finance and supply. 
 
 Cooperatives schemes are one means for working towards a sustainable social, environmental 
and economic expansion (Gertler, 2001). In the U.S., Western Europe and other advanced 
agricultural countries, agricultural cooperatives have been well known for providing market 
access and competitive returns to independent producers (Chaddad et al., 2005).  The 
following are some of the economic benefits provided by cooperatives: access to and secure 
markets for the long term; build up countervailing power; increase technological and market 
efficiency; decrease and internalize transaction (information) costs, with a better flow of 






increase the income of members (Szabo, 2006). In 1994, the United Nations estimated that the 
livelihood of 3 billion people (almost half the world’s population) was secured through 
cooperative enterprises. ICA (2005) estimated that more than 725 million people were 
members of cooperatives which created around 100 million jobs.  
 
Currently, commercial agricultural cooperatives have played a major role in the global market 
by forming joint ventures in order to jointly export their products, and continue to serve their 
members by looking for growth opportunities and useadvanced technology (USDA, 2002). In 
the 20th century, agricultural cooperatives in South Africa played a major role in the 
development of commercial agriculture, albeit with government’s assistance through 
subsidized interest rates, tax concessions and price supports (Ortmann and King, 2007a). 
Agricultural cooperatives are typically classified according to three major functions they 
perform, namely: marketing, supply and service. Marketing cooperatives help cooperative 
members to market and sell their farm produce and maxi ize the return that they receive for 
these goods. Supply cooperatives sell farm supplies (such as seed, fertilizer, petroleum, 
chemicals and farm equipment) to their members. Service cooperatives provide various 
services (such as pesticide application, seed cleaning and artificial insemination) to their 
members (Ortmann and King, 2006). 
1.5 A comparison of traditional cooperatives, new generation cooperatives and 
companies 
 
Basic differences exist between the cooperative and other forms of businesses such as 
proprietorship, partnership and the corporation. A major difference lies in how profits are 
shared. Cooperatives return profits to their investors based on investor patronage (usage of 
cooperative services) and other businesses distribute profits based on investment in the 
business. Whilst a cooperative distributes net returns or losses primarily to users of its 
services, an investor-owned firm (IOF) distributes r turns to shareholders, who are the owners 
of the firm’s capital. Buccola (1994:431) defines an IOF as a “firm in which ownership and 
control are proportionate to equity capital invested rather than in proportion to use of the 
firm’s services”. The main characteristic differenc between cooperatives and IOFs is 
contracting and ownership. IOF’s targets are based on wealth - the richer the investor is, the 






company. In a cooperative each member always has one vote irrespective of individual market 
share. Hence, no one is better off than the other in a cooperative. Table 1.2 compares the 
business structure of traditional cooperatives (TCs), new generation cooperatives (NGCs) and 
companies. The major difference is in ownership structure. 
Table 1.2: A comparison of traditional cooperatives, new generation cooperatives and 
companies 







One member, one vote 
or voting based on 
patronage proportion. 
One member, one 
vote based on 
patronage proportion. 












Based on patronage of 
cooperative. 
Based on patronage of 
cooperative. 
Based on share capital. 
Ownership rights Restricted to farmer 
patrons. 
Restricted to farmer 
patrons. 
Open to community. 
Membership 
restrictions 
Restricted to material 
participants. 
Restricted to material 
participants. 
None. 




Equity shares and 
delivery rights are 
tradable and share 
prices are appreciable. 
Shares can appreciate 
in value. 
Companies may not 
buy back their own 
shares. 
Source: UWCC (1998), Brown and Merrett (2000), Competition Commission (2004) 
 
Membership in TCs is open, hence, any producer can join simply by bringing their product to 
be processed, marketed, or handled by the cooperativ . There is generally no up-front 
investment other than a nominal membership fee and there is also typically no further 
commitment to further patronize the cooperative. NGCs are closed agricultural cooperatives 
that engage in value-added activities and issue equity shares that obligate each shareholder to 
deliver a commodity for processing (Umarov, 2002). 
 
NGCs have particular characteristics that differentiate them from traditional agricultural 






commodities, a significant equity contribution by farmer members, obligation of product 
delivery based on equity contribution, equity shares and delivery rights are tradable and share 
prices can appreciate, reflecting members expected returns over time (Ortmann and King, 
2007a).  The two similar characteristics between NGCs and TCs are: earnings are based on 
member patronage and most TCs and NGCs follow a one member, one vote rule. NGCs 
emerged as a result of structural changes in agriculture and were designed to address problems 
of TCs such as ownership rights.  
 
In contrast, company investors are owners and have the right to vote based on members’ 
shareholding in the company. It is also important to note that patronage drives TCs since 
profits and liquidation proceeds are distributed based on patronage (Hanson, 2000). 
Companies have a great advantage over TCs and NGCs since they have a diversity of 
membership, a wider exposure to capital, a greater potential in achieving threshold 
membership, a greater community commitment, and flexibility in options to grow differ 
greatly from cooperatives. The inherent problems of TCs include free rider, horizon, portfolio, 
control, and influence cost problems caused by vaguely-defined property rights (see section 
1.5.1). NGCs essentially add a new set of well-defined property rights to the ill-defined 
property rights of TCs (Lyne and Collins, 2008). Problems associated with NGCs are that they 
have limited entry of new members and maintain an effective governance structure (for 
example, undue pressure exerted by members  on management to link voting rights to delivery 
rights due to their high financial stake in the busine s) (Harris et al., 1996; Royer, 1999).  
1.6 Institutional flaws of traditional cooperatives 
 
Economists have applied property rights theory (PRT) and agency theory (AT) as theoretical 
frameworks for identifying incentive problems within the cooperative form (Vitaliano, 1983; 
Porter and Scully, 1987; Nilsson, 2001; Ortmann andKing, 2007a). These theories converge 
on a set of interrelated incentive problems that are creating disadvantages for cooperative 
members in traditional cooperatives. Some incentive problems are investment-related 
(common property/free rider, horizon, portfolio problems) whereas other incentive problems 






1.6.1 Free-rider problem (or problem with common ownership) 
 
Since ownership of the cooperative’s assets is colle tive, there is a high probability of free-
rider problems since property rights are not tradable, are insecure or unassigned. Royer (1999) 
identified this as the “common property problem” of restricted residual claims in the context 
of labour managed organizations. Royer (1999) argues that this problem emerges when 
property rights are not tradable or not sufficiently well-defined or enforced to ensure that 
individuals bear the full cost of their actions or receive the full benefits they create. The free-
rider problem can either be internal or external. Regarding internal free-rider problems the 
rights of residual claims in a traditional cooperative are linked to patronage instead of 
investment, and external free-rider problems occur “whenever a cooperative provides its 
members with collective goods characterised by de facto unfeasibility of exclusion…” 
(lliopoulos and Cook, 1999:80, as cited by Ortmann d King, 2007a).  
1.6.2 Horizon problem 
 
This problem occurs as a result of the limited planning horizons of the members in a 
cooperative, and residual rights cannot be transferred when members withdraw. The different 
planning horizons between members, management and elected representatives make it 
difficult to make optimal investment decisions, and this inhibits the overall development of the 
organisation (Nilsson, 2001). The implication of horiz n problems for the performance of a 
cooperative organization is that residual claimants can capture the benefits of investment 
decisions only over the time horizons of their expected membership in the organization 
(Vitaliano, 1983).  
1.6.3 Portfolio problem 
 
Cook (1995) views this problem from a cooperative’s perspective as “another equity 
acquisition problem”. The portfolio problem restrics residual claims to the patron group in 
cooperatives, which deprives members of the opportunity to diversify their investment 
portfolios to minimize risk (Vitaliano, 1983). Such portfolio problems usually give rise to 
further differences in preferences among subgroups of cooperative members. The result is 






1.6.4 Control problem 
 
Organisations bear control costs as the interests of management (agent) and their 
representative board of directors (principal) diverge. For example, if new members are 
allowed to join without paying any membership fees may result in market distortion. Members 
become reluctant to get involved or invest. “This is an indication of market forces in the 
relationship between the members and the organization - members receive insufficient 
compensation for their involvement, thus, the owner-control does not work” (Nilsson, 
2001:330). Control over the firm is thus weakened, since attempts by members to affect 
change cannot achieve the intended objectives. The principal-agent problems are reduced by 
the fact that the board is specifically responsible for controlling and directing the management. 
Severe control problems in a traditional cooperative arise because shares are not transacted at 
market value, so members do not get a clear signal of management performance (Royer, 
1999). 
1.6.5 Influence cost problem 
 
The influence cost problem arises because members have diverging interests which are linked 
to individual farm production activities. Members differ according to size of their farms and 
the location of their farms relative to collection / processing sites (Royer, 1999; Trewin, 2004). 
Influence costs are “associated with activities in which members or groups within an 
organization engage in an attempt to influence the decisions that affect the distribution of 
wealth or other benefits within an organization” (Royer, 1999:56). The extent of influence 
costs depends on factors such as the existence of a central authority, procedures that govern 
decision making, and the degree of homogeneity or confli t of interests amongst cooperative 
members (Cook, 1995). Traditional cooperatives suffer an influence problem because voting 
power is not proportional to investment. Potential investors are faced with the prospect that 
their money will be invested in enterprises preferred by members who have a voting majority 
(e.g., risk averse members) (Cook, 1995; Royer, 1999; Lyne and Collins, 2008). The inability 
of investors to influence investment decisions also discourages lenders from financing 
cooperatives. Whilst the free-rider, horizon, portflio and control problems can all be resolved 






abandoning the traditional cooperative principle of one-member, one-vote (Cook, 1995; Cook 
and IIiopoulos, 2000; Chaddad and Cook, 2004).  
 













Cooperatives which are viable are likely to ride on their success and remain functional - even 
grow (Gertler, 2001). Lyne (2007) argues that cooperative performance is damaged by weak 
institutional arrangements that constrain capital and which lead to strategic choices that 
depend largely on group dynamics. Different firms within an industry are heterogeneous in 
terms of the resources they possess and strategies they pursue and those differences create 
different performance outcomes.  This chapter focuses on the factors that affect performance 
of smallholder cooperatives in developing regions. The first section presents the definition of 
performance, followed by the characteristics of smallholder cooperatives in South Africa in 
the second section. The third section presents the factors influencing the performance of 
smallholder agricultural cooperatives. The fourth section gives an overview of the main school 
of thought adopted in this study (New Institutional Economics), and its application to 
cooperatives is presented in the fifth section. Thelast section presents the inter-relationships 
between performance, institutional arrangements and governance. 
2.2 Definitions of performance, institutions and governance 
 
Performance is difficult to measure and interpret in he case of cooperatives, which generally 
aim to pay their members the best price for the products received, or to charge the lowest 
possible price for the inputs and services supplied (Dess and Robinson, 1984; Kyriakopoulos 
et al., 2004). Several authors (e.g., Gassenheimer et al., 1989; Yavas et al., 1989; Yavas et al., 
1989; Read and Miller, 1990; Harrington et al., 1991; Clarke, 1991) define performance as 
improved product quality, productivity, technical efficiency, service capabilities of a firm, and 
logistical performance (which include an organisation’s ability to meet promised delivery 
dates), leading to sustainable profits. According to Dess and Robinson (1984), two popular 
measures of economic performance are return on assets and growth in sales. In this study, 






generating a net surplus; access to equity and debt capi al; reduced reliance on government 
funding; investment in growth assets such as poultry pens and vegetable tunnels; skills 
training of cooperative members; and good marketing arrangements.  
 
Institutions are the “rules of the game” of a society or, more formally, the humanly-devised 
constraints that structure human interaction (Klein, 1999; North, 2000; Kherallah and Kirsten, 
2002). The most commonly agreed upon definition for institutions is: a set of formal rules 
(laws, contracts, political systems, organisations a d markets) and informal rules of conduct 
(norms, traditions, customs, value systems, religions and sociological trends) that facilitate 
coordination or govern relationships between individuals or groups (Kherallah and Kirsten, 
2002). This study investigates institutional arrangements and governance factors that 
characterise smallholder agricultural cooperatives n KZN and which affect their performance. 
In particular, it examines rules governing membership, voting rights, the distribution of net 
surpluses, capital gains and the tradability of shares. 
 
King (2002:1) defined corporate governance as “…the building of a balance between 
economic and social goals and between individuals and communal goals, with the aim being 
to align as closely as possible the interest of indiv duals, organisations and society”. King 
(2002) listed seven characteristics of good corporate governance as discipline, transparency, 
independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness and social responsibility. In this study, 
governance indicators are defined in terms of electoral procedures, financial audit, training and 
access to information and meetings.  
2.3 Characteristics of smallholder farmers in South Africa 
Smallholder cooperatives are often a significant par of the agricultural structure, especially in 
developing countries. They often serve as the engin of economic growth and livelihood 
improvement (Machethe and Van Rooyen, 1983). However, funding opportunities for 
smallholder farmers and cooperatives remain a challenge since funders such as banks require 
some form of collateral, which smallholders often do not have. Before 1994, most established 
smallholder cooperatives in South Africa started their businesses from donated funds from the 






Smallholder farmers often face barriers to accessing resources, including credit and 
information, and their markets are often constrained by inadequate property rights and high 
transaction costs (Lyne, 1996). Williamson (2000) considers transaction costs as costs of 
organizing, maintaining and transacting exchanges. These costs include search and 
information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and policing and enforcement cost. 
According to Lyne (1996) and Delgado (1999), smallholder farmers in Africa are often faced 
with high transaction costs in the production and marketing of agricultural outputs due to the 
nature of their products and the institutional environment in which they operate. Access to 
markets can be considered according to three dimensons: physical access to markets (markets, 
costs); structure of the markets (asymmetry of relations between farmers, market 
intermediaries and consumers); and producers’ lack of skills, information and organization 
(understanding of the market, prices, bargaining) (IFAD, 2003). 
Smallholder farmers often have little knowledge or n  information on market conditions, and 
their experience on market negotiation is limited. This is mostly aided by the lack of 
education. For example, research on two communal areas of KwaZulu-Natal province 
(Impendle and Swayimana) showed that education levels of the respondents in both study 
areas are generally low (mean of 5.2 years) and only 36% of all respondents speak English 
(32.5 speak and write English) (Matungul et al., 2001).  In addition, Matungul et al., (2001) 
showed that smallholder farmers in these communal are s normally sell their produce through 
informal channels, such as neighbours, local shops and monthly pensioners. In South Africa, 
smallholder farming is generally associated with black agriculture in former homeland areas.  
2.4 Some institutional and governance problems influencing the performance                                                                                                       
of traditional smallholder cooperatives 
 
Smallholders often face a number of barriers, e.g., transport constraints to accessing the 
market for their produce and, hence, their market is limited to local community members such 
as neighbours, local shops, schools and pensioners (Matungul et al., 2001; Magingxa and 
Kamara, 2003). According to the IFAD (2003), market access can be defined in three 
dimensions: physical access to markets (distance, transport costs, etc.); structure of the 
markets (asymmetry of relations between farmers, market intermediaries and consumers); and 






smallholder access to preferred markets by reducing unit marketing and transaction costs, their 
members often do not understand the market well, lack information on market conditions, and 
have little experience with market negotiations (Magingxa and Kamara, 2003).  
 
Membership of TCs is open, hence, any producer can join by purchasing shares at their par 
(rather than their appreciated) price. There is generally no up-front investment other than a 
nominal membership fee and there is also typically no further commitment to patronise the 
cooperative. TCs follow a one-member, one-vote rule, regardless of the member’s level of 
patronage or level of investment. Institutional problems faced by TCs include free rider, 
horizon, portfolio, control, and influence cost problems caused by vaguely-defined property 
rights (for a detailed analysis of these, see section 1.6). Free rider, horizon and portfolio 
problems are investment related whilst control and influence cost problems are decision-
related (Nilsson, 2001). 
 
An obstacle often faced by TCs is their difficulty to raise capital necessary to finance long 
term strategies (Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000). TCs have constrained access to debt and equity 
capital, being able to raise it only from owner-patrons who have little incentive to invest 
because capital is not rewarded at market-related rates – investors cannot realise capital gains 
and dividends are capped (Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001; Chaddad and Cook, 2004). 
Financial institutions have been hesitant to provide credit to cooperatives due to the high risks 
associated with lending to them (Ortmann and King, 2007a). High risks are due to insufficient 
equity capital; the influence problem (caused by egalitarian voting rights), which prevents the 
majority investors from influencing investment decisions; poor financial record-keeping; and 
high transaction costs involved in granting small loans (Coetzee and Vink, 1991; as cited by 
Ortmann and King, 2007a). When equity and debt capital are constrained, the cooperative is 
unable to finance investments in growth assets suchas poultry pens or vegetable tunnels, or in 
fencing to secure a cooperative’s property from potential losses such as theft. In order to 
ensure its long-term sustainability, a cooperative ne ds adequate capital for both its initial 
development and its ongoing operation (Ling, 2005; Crow, 2006). Difficulty in raising capital 
implies that smallholder cooperatives in developing regions are usually dependent on 







According to Crawford (1997), an attempt to divert the purpose and resources of cooperatives 
to the support of particular political objectives adversely affects cooperative development. 
Ngubane (2008), a KZNDAEA extension officer based in the Msunduzi sub-district, 
expressed the view that only a minority of smallholder cooperative members had a genuine 
interest in developing their cooperative. The Deputy Manager of agricultural cooperatives in 
KZN put it more bluntly, stating that some smallholders established cooperatives to access 
government grants rather than to develop a business (Zulu, 2007). An ‘influence problem’ is 
anticipated when members of a cooperative have divergent interests and equal voting power. 
Democratic voting rights tend to discourage more entrepreneurial members from investing in a 
TC because they face the prospect of their capital being used to finance assets preferred by 
risk averse members who hold majority voting power. This ‘influence problem’ also 
discourages lenders from financing TCs and could leave many of KZN’s smallholder 
cooperatives dependent upon external aid for their survival. The divergent interests of 
members could also manifest in a ‘portfolio problem’ because members of a TC cannot 
transact equity shares at their market value. This problem leads to sub-optimal investment by 
members because they are unable to diversify their own portfolios to reflect personal risk 
preferences. The performance of cooperatives also depends on educating and training 
cooperative members, and enhancing their knowledge of cooperative principles and members’ 
rights (Ortmann and King, 2007a). Birchall (2004) argues that cooperatives that lack capital 
and business management capacity have had a rather disappointing history in developing 
countries.  
 
Several authors (Barratt, 1989:2; Anderson and Heneha , 2003; Kherallah and Kirsten, 2002) 
highlighted some of the factors contributing to cooperative performance as access to capital 
start-up costs; degree and nature of business skill training available to cooperative members; 
degree of training and experience in marketing and market analysis, costing, bookkeeping, 
literacy and management skills; attitudes towards work; and degree of cooperative community 
ethos. The majority of smallholders who engage in cooperative activity do not have access to 
standard guarantees for loans from financial institutions; they rarely own any property that 
they could use as collateral. If the cooperative dos not have equity or assets financed from 
equity, borrowing is difficult (Ortmann and King, 2007a). Traditional cooperatives struggle to 






Collins, 2008). In addition, for any given level of equity, lenders discriminate against 
traditional cooperatives owing to the influence problem. Financial institutions are profit 
making organizations that are risk averse and are designed to make as much profit as possible 
at minimal risk for their shareholders. Hence, the higher the project risk, the less likely the 
cooperative will get funding without collateral (Barr tt, 1989; Ortmann and King, 2007a).  
According to Gertler (2001), the history, location, a d economic condition of the organisation, 
regulatory context, the experience of key personnel, and links to other organisations are 
additional factors that affect performance.  
 
Research conducted by Machethe (1990) on six smallholder agricultural cooperatives in the 
former homelands of South Africa suggested that the following factors were major reasons for 
the poor performance of these cooperatives: inadequat  capital; lack of membership identity 
with the cooperatives; and cooperatives’ failure to pr vide transport for delivery of members’ 
purchases. In addition, failure of cooperatives to compete with other businesses; inability of 
cooperatives to keep adequate input stock; and inability of members to dismiss inefficient 
management were contributory factors. 
 
According to Machethe (1990), many cooperative members of the study cooperatives had the 
“wrong” reasons for joining a cooperative. For example, the largest percentage (23.75%) 
stated they joined cooperatives to buy goods on credit, 22.50% said they joined to sell produce 
through the cooperative, 8.75% for financial benefit, and 8.75% because they thought it is 
compulsory. Only 41% of the respondents understood that cooperatives were owned by 
members, 23% did not know who owned the cooperative, and 5% thought cooperatives 
belonged to whites. With regards to the difference between a company and a cooperative, 26% 
assumed there was no difference, 19% did not know the difference, while 11% knew the 
cooperative was owned by its members. Regarding competition with other businesses, many 
respondents (48%) bought goods from local shops for reasons such as prices of local shops 
were lower (16.25%), local cooperatives did not carry many items (22.55%) and 6.25% stated 
that other outlets provided transport, which weakened the cooperative’s financial position 
(Machethe, 1990). Clearly, the statistics show that most cooperative members lacked 






cooperatives. This could have been a result of lackof business skills and education of these 
members.  
 
Van der Walt (2005) confirmed that 65 per cent of 54 registered cooperatives sampled in the 
Limpopo province were not functional. The failure of cooperatives in South Africa’s 
communal areas has been largely blamed on poor management (Van Niekerk, 1988; Van der 
Walt, 2005). Agricultural cooperative performance is usually assessed according to the goals 
of the cooperative, many of which are established for economic reasons such as promoting the 
financial sustainability of cooperative members (Machethe, 1990). Performance is also 
measured according to members’ satisfaction since they are the primary drivers of 
productivity. Machethe (1990) states that the success of cooperatives is brought about if 
members’ interests are served enough to satisfy the majority of members. However, 
performance of cooperatives in the former homelands was generally unsatisfactory 
irrespective of the benchmark used (Machethe, 1990).  
 
The factors influencing poor performance reflect the absence of a well functioning market for 
shares to signal management performance in a traditional cooperative (Machethe, 1990). 
Perhaps they are a result of the absence of institutional arrangements that promote 
transparency and accountability like externally audited financial statements, adequate notice of 
meetings, circulation of minutes and voting by secret ballot. According to Kherrallah and 
Kirsten (2002), institutions have an influence on human behaviour, and in turn have profound 
effects on outcomes such as economic performance, efficiency, economic growth and 
development of an organisation. They can either facilit te or retard the performance of 
smallholder cooperatives. New Institutional Economics (NIE) considers that the cost of 
transacting – determined by institutions and institutional arrangements – is the key to 
economic performance. Ortmann (2005) states that good institutions (i.e., rules, laws and 
conventions that govern economic behaviour) are essntial in promoting exchange and the 
operation of market forces by securing property rights and enforcing predictable rules of law. 
A favourable institutional environment and an enabled management and workforce, ceteris 
paribus, improve the operating efficiency of an enterprise (Knight et al., 2003). Production 
cooperatives face an additional and potentially more damaging institutional problem if 






2.5 Theory of New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
 
The term “New Institutional Economics” was first coined by Williamson (1985) but emerged 
with Coase’s 1937 article “The Nature of the Firm”. The NIE is a multidisciplinary field 
which combines economics, law, organizational theory, political science, business 
organisation and sociology (Kherallah and Kirsten, 2002). NIE is concerned with the social, 
economic and political institutions that govern everyday life. NIE provides an insight into 
understanding factors affecting market and non-market participation by smallholder farmers 
(Dorward et al., 2000).  
According to Williamson (2000), there are two levels of NIE, namely the macro (institutional 
environment) and the micro (institutional arrangements). The institutional environment 
encompasses the “rules of the game” or background co straints (North, 2000), comprised of 
both formal legal rules and informal social norms that govern individual behaviour and 
structure social interactions. By contrast, institutional arrangements are governance structures 
designed between economic units to mediate particular economic relationships (Klein, 1999). 
NIE aims to explain what institutions are, how they arise, what purposes they serve, how they 
change and how they should be reformed (Klein, 1999). Kherallah and Kirsten (2002:1) state 
that “this new direction of economics considers that t e cost of transacting – determined by 
institutions and institutional arrangements – is the key to economic performance”.  
NIE has a dual purpose; it explains the determinants of institutions and their evolution over 
time, including evaluating their impact on economic performance, efficiency, and distribution 
(Nabli and Nugent, 1989). In a nutshell, NIE provides a useful framework that could help 
determine the types of institutions needed (either formal or informal) to improve economic 
performance in developing countries. It helps to identify a series of obstacles, problems, 
imperfections, and failures, both in states and in markets that can or should be remedied by 
various institutional means. NIE has several branches, the most common being the transaction 
cost, agency, collective action and property rights approaches, which are discussed below 






2.5.1  Transaction cost economics 
 
New institutional economists emphasize the potential costliness of transactions. The 
transaction cost approach was first introduced by Ronald Coase (1937) in his article “The 
nature of the firm” and formulated by Williamson in 1965. Coase referred to transaction cost 
as the cost of organising and transacting exchanges. Coase (1937) noted that transaction costs 
include search and information costs (finding products and appropriate suppliers), bargaining 
costs (negotiating and establishing the agreement) a d policing and enforcement costs 
(ensuring the other person conforms to agreements) (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). Zaibet 
and Dunn (1998) indicated that transaction costs include high transport costs due to the 
distance of the farm from the market, poor or non-exist nt infrastructure, high marketing 
margins due to monopoly power, and high costs of searching and monitoring contracts. 
 
A major element of transaction costs relates to market information; these are costs associated 
with a lack of access to sources of market information. Abdulai and Delgado (1999) maintain 
that a decline in the cost of information and transport flows as a result of a good infrastructure 
reduces transaction costs. Makhura et al. (2004) defined access to information, amongst 
others, as having the opportunity of listening to the radio for agricultural information. The 
study found that access and use of such information d fferentiated between farmers selling 
more agricultural produce from those selling less (Makhura et al., 2004).  
 
The transaction costs of small-scale farmers emanate from a number of sources. In the first 
place, smallholder farmers and cooperatives are often located in remote areas far away from 
service providers and major consumers of farm products (Makhura et al., 2004). The distance 
to the market together with the poor infrastructure, poor access to assets and information is 
manifested in high exchange costs. In order to participate in the market, it is necessary to 
discover who the buyers and sellers are, what the terms are, conduct negotiations, draw up a 
contract (e.g., forward contracting), and undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the 






2.5.2 Agency theory  
Agency theory is a second branch of NIE which focuses on information asymmetries, and 
especially how opportunistic agents can use them to pursue their own interests (Doner and 
Schneider, 2000). The core of this theory is the relationship between the principal (owner) and 
the agent (management). Principal-agent problems, according to Doner and Schneider (2000), 
arise when principals have difficulties in controlling agents, and where managers exploit 
information asymmetries to further their own interests. This theory explains that by means of a 
system of rewards the principal can reach a consensu  between his own goals and those of the 
agent, and describes how the principal can direct and control the agent (Nilsson, 2001). 
Principal-agent problems plague the modern corporation where ownership and management 
are separated, and where, as a result, shareholders (th  principals) have difficulties controlling 
managers (their agents), and where managers exploit inf rmation asymmetries to further their 
interests in appropriating the firm’s surplus. Thus, agency theory studies the structure of the 
principal/agency relationships in order to reduce ag ncy costs associated with moral hazard of 
the agents (Klein, 1999). Ortmann and King (2007a:54) noted that “agency theory is relevant 
to the institutional structure of cooperatives because employed agents (managers) may not act 
in the best interest of the cooperative members (princi al)”. 
2.5.3 Collective action theory 
Collective action means group action and, hence, collective action theory refers to activities 
that require the coordination of efforts by at least two or more individuals to further their 
interests (Sandler, 1992:1). However, in most group activities where people act collectively, 
there is an incentive for people to free ride at tht expense of others. Olson (1975) states that 
the free-rider problem usually occurs in cases where the group works towards the provision of 
a public good. Hence, collective action is associated with actions where members are 
interdependent so much that one person’s outcome is d pendent on the action of others. 
NIE provides a framework for identifying problems asociated with common property and 
collective action, and provides solutions with performance linked incentives. Collective action 
is viewed in a positive light by many institutional economists (Herath, 2005). It is a useful tool 
to analyse how to overcome the free-rider problem and come up with cooperative solutions for 






(1975), the success of collective action is related to the homogeneity of the groups. Features 
such as the size of the group, purpose and the similarity of group characteristics, their goals 
and incentives may foster cooperative behaviour. Work by Ostrom (1990) and others has 
shown that local institutional arrangements, including custom and social conventions designed 
to induce cooperative solutions, can overcome the collective action difficulties and help 
achieve efficiency in the use of such resources (Nabli and Nugent, 1989). 
2.5.4 Property rights theory 
Coase (1960) and Demsetz (1967) highlighted the importance of property rights in scarce 
resources. Their main proposition is that, in the absence of transaction costs, efficient resource 
allocation will occur with private property rights. This implies that private property is the most 
efficient system when land resources are scarce. Property rights develop to internalise 
externalities when the gains from internalisation are larger than the costs of internalisation 
(Demsetz, 1967). Ownership rights to an asset have an ffect on the incentive of the involved 
parties to invest when property rights are ill-defin d (as in a traditional cooperative). Without 
properly defined and identified ownership structures, there will be under-investment 
(Kherallah and Kirsten, 2002). Contractual difficulties generally arise from weak property 
rights, bilateral dependence, measurement difficulties, and weaknesses in the institutional 
environment (Williamson, 1996).  
Demsetz (1967) argues that property rights convey rights to individuals to either harm 
themselves or others. For example, an industry which causes sea pollution benefits at the 
expense of society. The Coase theorem (attributed to Ronald Coase) concerns economic 
efficiency of a government’s allocation of property ights. Coase (1960) theorem says that 
government involvement is not necessary if property rights are well established. Essentially, 
the theorem states that regardless of who owns the property rights, if no transaction costs exist, 
an efficient outcome will occur (individuals will bargain to correct any externality, which is 
defined as a cost or benefit resulting from an economic transaction that is borne or received by 
parties indirectly). According to Demsetz (1967), the primary function of property rights is to 
merely guide incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities. Cook (1995) used 






section 1.6). It is also on the basis of property rights that Chaddad and Cook (2004) 
characterised non-traditional cooperative models (see section 1.2.1). 
2.6 Application of the New Institutional Economics framework to cooperatives  
 
NIE can be applied to economic problems faced by agricultural businesses. Given that 
cooperatives exist to serve the interests of its members, problems such as transaction costs, 
agency costs, property rights and free-rider problems hinder them from achieving some of 
their objectives. For example, in the case of colletiv  action, some cooperative members 
might become free riders (in a case where some members invest and other members do not 
and still enjoy the benefits of the cooperative). The basic idea of NIE is that the success of a 
market system depends upon the institutions to facilitate efficient private transactions. North 
(1990) demonstrates that institutions matter because they provide the rules of the game, 
constraining human interaction and providing incentives for individuals and cooperatives to 
engage in productive and/or destructive political, economic, social and other activities. 
However, NIE has some limitations as transaction costs are difficult to observe and measure 
(Kherallah and Kirsten, 2002). The institutional environment has considerable influence on 
cooperatives, in terms of both their internal and external relations. The formal laws of the 
state, as well as local institutions based on custom and tradition, determine whether the 
environment for cooperatives development is an enabling or a disabling one (Stockbridge et
al., 2003).  
  
In this study, the performance of smallholder agricultural cooperatives will be analysed using 
NIE theory to show how the problems of ill-defined property rights suppress the growth and 
competitiveness of traditional cooperatives. Having defined and discussed NIE, the following 
discussion focuses on cooperatives and the problems associated with the traditional models of 
cooperatives and how well-defined institutions can help to solve those problems. 
2.7 Inter-relationships between performance, institutions and governance  
 
The objective of this study is to test the theoretical proposition that good cooperative 
performance is dependent upon sound institutions and good governance. The conceptual 






have a direct impact on good performance. In turn, sound institutional arrangements are 
influenced by good governance and vice versa.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Postulated relationships between cooperative performance, institutional 
arrangements and governance 
 
One route through which institutions (“rules of the game”) can influence performance of 
cooperatives is through their effects on the structure of cooperatives and the efficiency with 
which they operate. Institutions, such as property rights and contract law, shape the regulatory 
and economic environment within which cooperatives operate (North, 1990; Williamson, 
2000). They also influence the cooperative’s internal decisions and its productivity. In order to 
be successful it is important that a representative institution (e.g., management committee) is 
established that aspires to good governance and fair representation of its members.  
 
According to North (1990), institutions affect the p rformance of the economy or firm by their 
effect on the cost of exchange (transaction costs) and production. By influencing transaction 
costs and co-ordination possibilities, institutions can have the effect of either facilitating or 
retarding performance. Specific institutions govern the activities carried out by cooperatives in 
the course of using resources, producing output and engaging in transactions with others. Such 
institutions introduce structure into the operation f organisations and markets in order to 
improve the way in which they function. Institutions at these levels directly affect performance 
of organisations and therefore economic growth (Frances, 2004). 
 
Good performance 







A growing literature stresses that governance, broadly defined as the process whereby 
societies or organisations determine how power is exercised, whom they involve and how they 
render account (Graham et al., 2003; Saner and Wilson, 2003), is important for economic 
growth. In this study, governance includes a cooperative’s institutions and structures, decision 
making processes and its capacity to implement its decisions (Landell-Mills and Serageldin, 
1992), and is characterised by transparency (openness), accountability and participation. 
Together with good institutions, good governance promotes an organisation’s performance 
(North, 1990; Olson, 2003). 
 









3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter focuses on the research methodology to be used in this study. Case studies of 10 
selected smallholder cooperatives in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) will be analysed. The chapter is 
presented in four sections: the next section describes the research objectives and hypotheses of 
the study, followed by the method used to select the smallholder cooperatives. The last section 
provides an overview of the analytical tools used in the study. 
3.2 Research objectives and hypotheses 
 
The study aims to gain a better understanding of the characteristics of 10 selected (case-study) 
smallholder agricultural cooperatives in KZN, and to determine some of the performance, 
institutional and governance constraints that these smallholder cooperative members are 
facing. 
3.2.1 Research objectives 
 
Specific objectives of this research are: 
• To characterise and understand the selected smallholder agricultural cooperatives. 
• To determine the performance, institutional and governance factors that influence the 
performance of these smallholder agricultural cooperatives in KZN. 
• Provide possible strategies and policies which could be considered to promote the 
performance of these smallholder cooperatives. 
3.2.2 Research hypotheses  
The hypotheses of this research are: 
• The nature of institutions (“rules of the game”) and governance (i.e., rules, norms, and 








• Lack of skills training and education on how to manage a cooperative hinder the 
performance of smallholder cooperatives.  
• Improved access to capital is essential in ensuring of overall performance of 
cooperatives. 
3.3 Data collection 
3.3.1 Sampling procedure and study areas in KZN 
KwaZulu-Natal has a diverse farming sector, ranging from subsistence to large commercial 
farms, and a wide range of enterprises such as livetock, maize, sugarcane, timber, fruit, cut 
flowers and herbs are practiced (Wikipedia, 2007). There are 11 municipal districts in KZN 












Figure 3.1: Map of municipal districts in KwaZulu-Natal, 2007 






Ten smallholder agricultural cooperatives in KZN were selected to serve as detailed case 
studies in this study. An updated list with the names of smallholder cooperatives in KZN was 
obtained from the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs 
(KZNDAEA) who work closely with these cooperatives. Due to funding and logistical 
constraints, the areas of study were limited to the EThekwini and UMgungundlovu Districts 
(the latter comprising of two sub-districts, namely Camperdown and Msunduzi), which 
incorporate the major cities of Durban and Pietermaritzburg in KZN. The case study 
cooperatives were selected with the help of extension officers from those districts. They were 
selected because they had been operating for at least two years and were willing to participate 
in the study. All the selected cooperatives were tradi ionally structured as defined in Chapter 
2. Five of the selected cooperatives were from the EThekwini District, three from the 
Msunduzi District and two from the Camperdown District.  
3.3.2 Study data collection and questionnaire design  
 
Personal interviews were conducted with the chairpersons, management committee and other 
cooperative members of the selected cooperatives in co junction with a structured 
questionnaire in order to obtain qualified answers. The questionnaire provided the respondents 
with some degree of anonymity so as to obtain as much unbiased information as possible. The 
first part of the questionnaire (see Appendix 4, Section A) seeks general information about the 
cooperative: formation, registration and operations f the cooperative. Section B (structure and 
organization) aims to understand the general structu e and how the cooperative is organized in 
terms of membership, governance and accountability. Section C (financial management) aims 
to understand the most challenging factors that most smallholder traditional cooperatives face, 
including equity and debt capital financing, growth prospects, auditing, turnover and 
government interventions (such as providing cooperative training; monitoring and evaluation 
of cooperatives). 
3.3.3 Pre-testing and implementation 
 
A pilot study on three smallholder agricultural cooperatives in the Msunduzi district 
(Pietermaritzburg) was conducted in October 2007 to pre-test the questionnaire. The purpose 






The pilot study proved useful because some of the questions which seemed ambiguous were 
then rephrased so that future respondents could better comprehend them. Ten smallholder 
agricultural cooperatives were then interviewed, including three poultry, five vegetable, one 
beef and one bakery cooperative.  
3.4 Analytical tools 
 
This section presents the analytical framework used in this study to assess the factors which 
affect the performance of smallholder agricultural cooperatives in KZN. The following 
analytical tools were used:  
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics were used to characterise and understand the structure of the selected 
smallholder agricultural cooperatives in KZN. These statistics were used to analyse total 
membership; average number of management meetings per month (a governance factor); 
gender and age composition of cooperative members; and the characteristics of chairpersons 
of these cooperatives (e.g., gender, age and education). In addition, the descriptives analysed 
the initial capital structure of these cooperatives; annual turnover; amount of money kept in 
the bank; growth opportunities; and institutional and governance factors influencing the 
performance of these cooperatives. The results of the descriptive statistics are presented in 
Chapter 4.  
3.4.2 Cluster analysis  
 
Cluster analysis of institutional, governance and performance variables has been adopted on 
the basis of two arguments: firstly, to test for positive relationships hypothesised between 
cooperative performance, institutional arrangements and governance (Figure 2.1); and, 
secondly, to identify homogeneous groups or clusters of variables in a multivariate data set.  
The term cluster analysis was first used by Tryon in 1939. It encompasses a number of 
different algorithms and methods for grouping objects of similar kind into respective 
categories (Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984). A general question facing researchers in many 
areas of inquiry is how to organise observed data into meaningful structures, that is, to develop 






sorting different objects into groups in a way that the degree of association between two 
objects is maximal if they belong to the same group and minimal otherwise. It can be used to 
discover structures in data without explaining why t ey exist. According to Romesburg 
(1984), cluster analysis is not as much a typical statistical test as it is a "collection" of different 
algorithms that put objects into clusters according to well-defined similarity rules.  
Cluster analysis can be used for a variety of goals (Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984:9); e.g., 
(1) for developing typologies or classifications, (2) for generating concepts or hypotheses 
through data exploration, and (3) for testing whether typologies or classifications generated by 
other procedures, or by using other data, are present in the data set under consideration. Data 
clustering algorithms can be hierarchical or non-hierarchical. Hierarchical cluster analysis, the 
method to be employed in this study, involves the construction of a hierarchy of treelike 
structures. Each observation begins with its own cluster and, at each successive step, 
observations or clusters of observations are merged into fewer “natural groupings” 
(Anderberg, 1973:3; Norusis, 1994:100). In the non-hierarchical methods, the number of 
clusters is predetermined and thereby the observations are allocated among the number of 
clusters.  
 
Hierarchical cluster analysis algorithms can be classified into divisive ("top-down") or 
agglomerative ("bottom-up") clusters (Waters and Barr, 1980; Romesburg, 1984). 
Agglomerative algorithms are computationally faster and, hence, are commonly used. Whilst 
agglomerative algorithms begin with each element as a separate cluster and merge them into 
successively larger clusters, divisive methods split a number of individuals into successively 
smaller clusters. Cluster analysis has been used in the field of medicine, clustering diseases, 
cures for diseases, or symptoms of diseases (Harrigan, 1985). In the field of life sciences, 
objects of cluster analysis are life forms such as pl nts, animals, insects, cells, and micro-
organisms. Knight et al. (2003) used cluster analysis to identify institutional/organisational 
practices of successful farmworker equity-share schemes in South Africa, and to discern a set 
of best institutional practices that will likely promote the success of future equity-share 
schemes. In this study, a cluster analysis will be performed on variables, obtained from the 
completed questionnaires to determine the institutional and governance factors influencing the 






The next chapter presents the characteristics of the 10 selected smallholder agricultural 







CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURA L 
COOPERATIVES IN KWAZULU-NATAL 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The potential of cooperatives and the extent of their d velopment have in many cases fallen 
short of expectations (Reynolds, 1997). Financial failures, poor management, misuse of funds, 
use of cooperatives for political ends and low standards of performance have been the 
common constraints of cooperative development in may less-developed countries (Crawford, 
1997). This chapter describes the characteristics of 10 case-study smallholder cooperatives in 
KwaZulu-Natal (KZN).  
4.2 Description of selected cooperatives 
  
With regards to total membership of the case-study cooperatives, the smallest cooperative had 
five members while the largest had 17 members. Thoug  all the cooperative members for each 
respective cooperative were present for the interviews, which were held in October and 
November 2007, the respondents to the questionnaire were the chairpersons or deputy 
chairpersons of each cooperative. Table 4.1 gives a summary of some basic information on the 
selected cooperatives. 
 
All the cooperatives were producer cooperatives marketing their own products. Five of the 
cooperatives focus on producing and marketing vegetabl s, three produce and market poultry, 
one is producing beef, and one is a bakery cooperativ  producing and marketing bread, buns 
and muffins. Some of the selected cooperatives have more than one line of enterprise. For 
example, poultry cooperative 2 engaged in post-harvest processing of jam made from guavas, 
peaches, papaws and melons. Poultry cooperatives 1 and 3 engaged in post-harvest processing 
of chicken (i.e., cleaning and packaging of chicken). In addition to their respective enterprises, 
vegetable cooperative 4 and poultry cooperative 2 also produced arts and crafts such as pottery 
and basket weaving. Five of the selected cooperativs were established in 2005 (Table 4.1), 
two were established in 2004, two in 2003 and one in 2002. With regards to registration, eight 
























Average number of 
meetings per annum 
Vegetable 
cooperative 1 
2005 2005 Chairperson 11 Msunduzi 4 
Vegetable 
cooperative 2 
2003 2005 Deputy 
Chairperson 
8 EThekwini 12 
Vegetable 
cooperative 3 
2003 2005 Chairperson 5 EThekwini 12 
Vegetable 
cooperative 4 
2002 2005 Chairperson 17 EThekwini 24 
Vegetable 
cooperative 5 
2004 2005 Chairperson 6 EThekwini 12 
Beef cooperative 2005 2006 Chairperson 11 Msunduzi Undefined* 
Bakery 
cooperative 
2005 2005 Chairperson 7 Camperdown 12 
Poultry 
cooperative 1 
2005 2006 Chairperson 8 Msunduzi 12 
Poultry 
cooperative 2 
2005 2005 Chairperson and 
Treasurer 
12 Camperdown 24 
Poultry 
cooperative 3 
2004 2005 Chairperson 8 EThekwini 24 






Effective meetings are an important part of the development and ongoing operation of a 
cooperative business. Effective meetings are those in which goals of the meeting are met and 
members’ participation is high (Harris, 2007). The study indicates that half of the selected 
cooperatives have, on average, one general meeting per month whilst three cooperatives have 
two general meetings per month. The beef cooperativ’s general meetings are only held if 
there is a need or when a crisis arises because they are currently focusing on breeding cattle. 
The next section discusses the selected cooperatives’ structure and organisation.  
4.3 Structure and organisation of selected cooperatives 
4.3.1 Vision and objectives 
 
Table 4.2 summarises the reasons that cooperative members provided for joining their 
cooperative.  
Table 4.2: Reasons of members for joining the select d cooperatives, KwaZulu-Natal, 
2007. 
Cooperative type Reasons for joining cooperative 
Vegetable cooperative 1 -  Encouraged by a community member 
- Affirmative action 
- Create employment opportunity for members  
Vegetable cooperative 2 - Poverty reduction 
- Create employment opportunity for members 
- Provide fresh vegetables to orphans in the local community 
Vegetable cooperative 3 -  Encouraged by a community member 
- Provide fresh vegetables for the school feeding pro ramme 
- To get the community involved in social and community development  
Vegetable cooperative 4 - To feed the needy - orphans and HIV/AIDS patients - with fresh vegetables 
- Provide vegetables for the soup kitchen at the local school 
- Teach the local community to plant organic foods 
- Create employment opportunities for members   
Vegetable cooperative 5 - Create employment opportunities for members 
- Provide fresh vegetables to the local community 
Beef cooperative - Create employment opportunities for members 
- Provide milk and beef products to the members and the local community 
Bakery cooperative - Encouraged by a community member 
- Community development 
- Poverty reduction 
- Create employment opportunities for members 
Poultry cooperative 1 - Encouraged by a community member 
Poultry cooperative 2 - Encouraged by a community member 
- Poverty reduction 
- Create employment opportunity for members 
- Affirmative action 






These reasons included the need for community development, creation of employment, 
affirmative action (i.e., to provide employment to previously disadvantaged women and 
orphans), and to provide food security for the membrs’ families. For example, the 
chairperson of the beef cooperative stated that their members joined for reasons of 
employment creation and to provide meat and milk products to the members and the local 
community. Members of six cooperatives also mentioned the encouragement of a community 
member as a reason for joining their cooperative.  
 
Table 4.3 addresses the vision/objective and strategies of each selected cooperative. Nine of 
the selected cooperatives had growth of assets as one of their long term goals. Almost all the 
cooperatives were relying on donations from the government or private organisations for 
expanding their business. For example, the bakery cooperative negotiated for donations from a 
larger bakery company to acquire a larger oven for baking more bread loaves per batch. The 
chairperson of the bakery cooperative had initiated an informal partnership with a bakery 
company mainly for technical assistance in providing a good service and improving product 
quality. The large bakery company, according to its mi sion statement, has a corporate social 
responsibility to improve the quality of life for employees and their families as well as for the 
local community and society at large, and to plough back a small percentage of their profits to 
the communities. It voluntarily sponsors community development projects and, hence, showed 
willingness to provide technical assistance to the bakery cooperative. Since both organisations 
are in the same line of business they could relatively easily integrate vertically or horizontally. 
Apart from providing technical assistance to the bakery cooperative, no memorandum of 
understanding exists between the bakery cooperative nd the bakery company.  
 
The selected cooperatives relied on various markets to sell their products. The target market 
for 30% of the selected cooperatives was their neighbours (Figure 4.1), who are people living 
around the cooperative area. These selected cooperatives relied on this market because they 
did not have access to transport to ship their produce to cities and other markets. Thirty 
percent of the cooperatives sold their products on all markets, namely neighbours, local shops, 






10% relied only on local shops. The beef cooperative did not sell any product since it is 
currently breeding cattle. 
Table 4.3: Vision/objective and strategies of selected smallholder cooperatives, KwaZulu-






Vision/ Objective Strategy  
Vegetable 
cooperative 1 
- To obtain a larger land area from the Municipality 
since they are currently using school grounds. 
- Increase number of vegetable tunnels to 12 from the 
one they currently have. 
- Diversify their plantings to green pepper, carrots and 
cucumber and engage in post-harvest processing of 
tomato sauce and tinned tomatoes. 
- To obtain financial assistance from 




- Build a pack house for their vegetables. 
- Obtain an irrigation system for the vegetables. 
- Arranged to obtain a pack house and 




- Extend their sales to nearby cities and towns. 
- Plant on all the 0.8ha of land available to them 
instead of the 0.5ha they are currently using. 
- Obtain training on producing high 




- Plant and sell organic vegetables to the community. 
- Supply organic foods to large chain stores such as 
Woolworths and Pick ‘n Pay. 
- Diversify into other enterprises such as Nguni cattle 
and goats. 
- To apply for funds from the 
Department of Trade and Industry to 
achieve their vision. 




- Create employment opportunities, especially for the
community youth. 
- Establish a warehouse that provides fruits and 
vegetables for the local stalls and shops. 
- Applied for a loan for the warehouse 





- Increase the number of Nguni cattle. 
- Own more farmland for cattle ranching/grazing. 




- To expand and grow into a private company. 
- Increase distribution of products to cities and towns. 
- Negotiated with a larger bakery 
company for assistance in acquiring a 
larger oven for baking more bread 
loaves per batch. 
Poultry 
cooperative 1 
- Expand their poultry houses to seven from the thre 
they currently have. 
- Diversify into other enterprises such as cattle 
breeding and goat production. 
- To apply for funding for chicken feed 
from Ithala Bank.  
Poultry 
cooperative 2 
- Provide employment opportunities to community 
members. 
- Decrease poverty levels, especially of orphans, by 
50% by 2009. 
- Diversify into mushroom and sugarcane enterprises. 
- Build temporary poultry pens until 
they obtain finance to build proper 
poultry structures. 
- Negotiated with the KZNDAEA for 
assistance with mushroom and 
sugarcane production advice. 
Poultry 
cooperative 3 
- Diversify into a poultry hatchery enterprise. 
- Provide employment opportunities to community 
members. 
- Applied for a loan which is still to be 
approved by Ithala Bank to expand 
their business. 






4.3.2 Gender and membership composition of selected cooperatives  
 
Table 4.4 shows the gender and age composition of members of the selected cooperatives. 
Only three cooperatives comprised of members of one gender only. The bakery cooperative 
and vegetable cooperative 4 comprised of only femals, and vegetable cooperative 5 of only 
males. Table 4.4 shows that females are in the majority in seven of the selected cooperatives. 
In seven of the case studies, the majority of members were older than 40 years of age. 
Vegetable cooperatives 2 and 3 and the beef cooperative had no members less than 40 years of 
age. 
 
Figure 4.1: Target market for selected smallholder cooperatives, KwaZulu-Natal, 2007. 
* “All markets” refers to neighbours, local shops, monthly pensioners and schools. 
** “No market” means the cooperative does not rely on any market at present (beef cooperative). 
 
4.3.3 Characteristics of cooperative chairpersons of elected cooperatives  
 
Leadership is not merely a function of traits that a person is born with; it is equally dependent 
upon the subsequent experiences, education and training (Gupta, 2008). All the selected 
cooperatives considered education as a prerequisite for their chairperson. The United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) agrees that education is an investment but argues that too 
many cooperative leaders and advisers consider it only as a cost that must be cut whenever 
times get tight (Hardesty, 2004).  Members’ interests are protected by putting in place a 
management committee with the relevant commercial sk lls (O’Connor and Thompson, 2001).  
 












10% Local shops 
Neighbours
Local shops and neighbours
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Table 4.4: Gender and age composition of cooperative members, KwaZulu-Natal, 2007. 
Gender Membership age Cooperative 
type 
Total 
membership Male (%) Females (%) > 40 years (%) <40years (%) 
Vegetable 
cooperative 1 
11 27 73 73 27 
Vegetable 
cooperative 2 
8 75 25 100 0 
Vegetable 
cooperative 3 
5 20 80 100 0 
Vegetable 
cooperative 4 
17 0 100 41 59 
Vegetable 
cooperative 5 
6 100 0 33 67 
Beef 
cooperative 
11 55 45 100 0 
Bakery 
cooperative 
7 0 100 71 29 
Poultry 
cooperative 1 
8 25 75 88 12 
Poultry 
cooperative 2 
12 17 83 83 17 
Poultry 
cooperative 3 
8 25 75 50 50 
 
Table 4.5 shows the gender, age and qualification of the chairperson of each selected 
cooperative, and the minimum skills required for a ch irperson to be appointed. 
 
4.4 Sources of finance for selected cooperatives 
 
The sources of finance for the cooperatives’ activities were members’ equity, government 
donations and loans from banks (especially Ithala Bank, a parastatal mandated to support 
enterprises undertaken by previously disadvantaged p ople). For example, the beef 
cooperative obtained 50 Nguni cows and cattle feed as initial capital from the KZNDAEA as a 
donation. The bakery cooperative obtained R250000 (40% grant and 60% loan) from the 
KZNDAEA which was used to purchase their baking equipment (Table 4.6). In addition to 
members’ equity, vegetable cooperative 2 obtained extension support (i.e., advice on 
vegetable production) and additional capital in theform of fertiliser, fencing, and use of a 
tractor as a donation from the KZNDAEA. Financial assistance to registered cooperatives by 
the government through Ithala Bank was provided based on a project proposal which had to be 



















Female 55 Grade 10 - Business minded 
- Trustworthy 




Male 42 Grade 7 - Committed  




Male 50 Grade 12 - Experience in agricultural activities 
- Good communication skills 
Vegetable 
cooperative 4 
Female 57 Grade 12 - Literate  
- Committed 
- Experience in executing plan of action 
Vegetable 
cooperative 5 
Male 27 Grade 12 - Good communication skills 
- Organisation and networking skills 
- Good leadership and analytical skills 
Beef cooperative Male 57 Grade 7 - Knowledge of farming  
- Loyalty  
Bakery 
cooperative 
Female 53 Grade 12 - Commitment  
Poultry 
cooperative 1 
Female 44 Grade 11 - Trustworthy  
- Active in cooperative activities 
Poultry 
cooperative 2 
Female 57 Grade 9 - Active cooperative member 
- Loyalty  
Poultry 
cooperative 3 
Female 63 Grade 10 - Experience in the cooperative business 
- Knowledge and drive for the business 
 
According to a loan analyst from Ithala Bank, farme cooperatives are funded by the 
KZNDAEA through Ithala Bank (Nhlapho, 2008). Since 2005 registered farmer cooperatives 
have been issued loans as long as the cooperative submitted its application with a sound 
business proposal; this took four to six weeks to approve. District coordinators were appointed 
by the KZNDAEA to screen cooperatives eligible for unding. These District coordinators 
would visit the site, study the business proposal and then register the cooperatives for business 
management training at a Further Education and Training (FET) College (FET Colleges are 






communities). The business proposal would then be sent to the KZNDAEA head office for 
approval. 
 
Four of the selected cooperatives (vegetable cooperativ s 1 and 3, the bakery cooperative and 
poultry cooperative 1) obtained loans from Ithala Bank that were guaranteed by KZNDAEA, 
whilst others are still waiting for their loans to be approved. In most cases, the issue of loans 
for any cooperative is done through quotations provided by the cooperative; e.g., if a poultry 
cooperative requires poultry feed, they obtain a quotation from Epol (a company that sells 
feed) and Ithala Bank pays the feed company directly. This approach serves to avoid misuse of 
funds by cooperative members and highlights principal-agent control problems that are 
commonly perceived to result in mismanagement. 
 
In the past, there was no defined criterion for measuring the creditworthiness of cooperatives. 
As long as the cooperative submitted a business plan, Ithala Bank would check the viability of 
the cooperative and issue the loan. However, the creditworthiness of cooperatives is currently 
under review by the KZNDAEA. Hence, the issue of loans to cooperatives has been suspended 
because levels of default were unacceptably high (Nhlapo, 2008). Cooperatives that fail to pay 
back their loans are not granted any further funds until they pay back their outstanding loan, 
otherwise the government hands over such cooperativs o attorneys to deal with the case. 
Initially, the maximum loan amount offered to cooperatives was R50000 in 2005 but was 
increased is R500000 in 2006 to allow for the funding of larger cooperative projects. 
According to the Ithala Bank loan analyst, interest charged on these loans varies depending on 
the loan amount. For example, loan amounts less than R100000 are charged an interest rate of 
11% and any loans greater than R100000 carry the prime interest rate (at the time of the 
survey it was 14%). This is done to discourage members from borrowing large amounts in the 








Table 4.6: Initial capital structure of selected smallholder agricultural cooperatives, KZN, 2007.     
* KZNDAEA = KwaZulu-Natal Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs 
**The prime interest rate at the time of survey in November 2007 was 14% 
***Includes equity capital, loans, and estimated value of grants and donations 






























- A vegetable tunnel, seedlings, fertiliser and advice on tomato production from Film Flex (a 
private organisation) valued at R10000 in 2005. 
- Extension support in the form of marketing strategies training from KZNDAEA*. 




- Fencing worth R10000, fertiliser worth R1500 in 2005, and use of a tractor for ploughing as a 
service from KZNDAEA. 
0  12300 
Vegetable 
cooperative 3 5 300 
- R20000 grant from KZNDAEA. 
- Technical advice on vegetable production as a service from KZNDAEA. 5000 11 25300 
Vegetable 
cooperative 4 
17 1100 - Technical advice on vegetable production as a service from KZNDAEA. 0  1100 
Vegetable 
cooperative 5 
6 2500 - No grant or donation received. 0  2500 
Beef 
cooperative 11 0 - 50 Nguni cows and feed worth R250000 in 2005 as a donation from KZNDAEA. 0  250000 
Bakery 
cooperative 




- Technical support on poultry production as a servic  from KZNDAEA. 
-  Three poultry pens, brooders, feeders, chicks valued at R75000 in 2005 from KZNDAEA. 




- Two weeks training on poultry production training from Further Education and Training (FET) 
College in EThekwini District at a cost of R25000 in 2005. 
- Poultry pen, brooders, feeders, chicks valued at R25000 in 2005 from KZNDAEA. 
- Chicks and feeds valued at R2500 in 2005 from Social Welfare. 




- Two weeks training on good business management skills and cooperative functions from FET 
College in EThekwini District at a cost of R25000 in 2004.  
-Technical advice on poultry maintenance from KZNDAEA as a service. 






Levels of equity contributed by members of the select d cooperatives depended on what each 
member could afford at the time of establishing thecooperative. Most of the selected 
cooperatives are currently financing their operations from government donations and sales 
turnover. It is clear that equity capital comprised a relatively small proportion of the estimated 
total initial capital investment. The beef cooperative relies on the KZNDAEA for their cattle 
feed, vaccines and other production inputs. Four of the cooperatives received loans from the 
KZNDAEA through Ithala Bank. Table 4.6 summarises the range of equity investments, 
grants (donations) and loans obtained by the selected cooperatives since inception.  
 
Table 4.6 shows that the beef cooperative obtained a government donation of 50 head of 
Nguni cattle valued at R250000 as start-up capital in 2005 and also obtains production inputs 
in the form of cattle feed and winter licks. Nine of the case studies obtained at least some of 
their initial capital from the government in the form of a grant and/or donation. For example, 
vegetable cooperative 1 obtained a tunnel, fertiliser, eedlings and extension support from a 
private organisation (Film Flex). Vegetable cooperative 2 obtained fencing, fertiliser, and use 
of a tractor for ploughing from the KZNDAEA. According to an extension officer from 
Msunduzi sub-district, the only benefit available for registered cooperatives was the ability to 
apply for government funding for their proposed projects (Ngubane, 2008).  
 
Traditional cooperatives are not allowed to seek capital from non-patrons (Hardesty, 2004), 
and often rely on government for loans. Commercial banks often require collateral (which 
smallholder cooperatives cannot provide) in order to issue loans. Traditional cooperatives have 
a problem in acquiring equity capital because the residual claimant (benefactor) is the patron 
of the firm, not the investor (IIiopoulos, 2003). In U.S. agricultural cooperatives, equity capital 
is typically provided by utilising these approaches: direct investment, retained patronage 
refunds, or per-unit capital retains (IIiopoulos, 2003). The fact that there is no evidence of any 
loans from commercial banks in Table 4.6 is evident that the study cooperatives are not 
creditworthy in the eyes of private sector lenders and investors. Table 4.7 shows the 









Table 4.7: Implications of equity and debt capital constraints faced by the selected 
cooperatives to finance growth assets, KwaZulu-Natal, 2007.  
 
Case study Implications of equity and debt constraints  
Vegetable 
cooperative 1 
- Currently operating on school premises with one vegetable tunnel, growing tomatoes in 
one season per year to generate funds. This makes it impossible for them to maintain a 
continuous supply of vegetables all year round and,hence, to generate regular income. 
Vegetable 
cooperative 2 
-  Lack of adequate water supplies for their produce 
- Inadequate farm equipment, such as a tractor, to assist with land preparation. 
Vegetable 
cooperative 3 
- Currently using school premises which has no room f r expansion  
- Inadequate farm equipment (such as a tractor), irrigation system for their vegetables and 
shortage of labour considering the cooperative comprises of five members only. 
Vegetable 
cooperative 4 
- Dry soil and lack of irrigation water for their vegetables 
- Lack of fencing creates more problems for them since animals such as cattle, goats and 
sheep graze in their fields if they are not guarded. 
Vegetable 
cooperative 5 
- Inadequate finance to erect a cold room to keep fruits and vegetables fresh. 
Beef 
cooperative 
- Lack of finance for daily operations since their cattle will only be sold in 2009 as per 
government order.  
Bakery 
cooperative 
- Limited baking equipment, which is a problem in that the cooperative cannot satisfy the 
demand for bread 
Poultry 
cooperative 1 




- Financial constraints for their daily operations such as supply of chicken feed and 
vaccines, and fencing.  
Poultry 
cooperative 3 
-  Inadequate finance for daily operations and, hence, depend on the government for 
funding to finance daily operations. 
 
Many of the case studies cannot afford to hire labour and purchase other operating inputs, 
which may suggest that these cooperatives are not sustainable. Members of eight of the study 
cooperatives were required to contribute equal labour hours and shared profits equally. 
However, members of two of the case studies (vegetable cooperative 1 and beef cooperative) 
contributed different labour hours but shared profits equally. Equal profit sharing for equal 
labour effort may not fully address the “labour free-rider” problem as members have an 
incentive to shirk while benefiting from the work of others.  
 
All of the selected cooperatives mentioned limited quity and debt capital for financing 
growth assets as factors influencing their performance in terms of growth and diversification. 
Whilst some of the poultry cooperatives lost their chickens to theft due to lack of physical 
infrastructure (fencing), other cooperatives faced problems of inadequate farm equipment and 
implements such as poultry pens, tractors and irrigation systems. The poultry and vegetable 
cooperatives indicated that they required the installation of more poultry pens and vegetable 






income) for the vegetable cooperatives in 2006/07 was R36000 and the lowest was R2300. 
With regards to poultry cooperatives, the highest turnover was R150000 and the lowest was 
R4800. The bakery cooperative had a turnover of R180000 in 2006/07 and the beef 
cooperative did not generate any income at the timeof the survey since the cooperative was 
still breeding cattle. 
4.5 Financial management of selected cooperatives 
 
4.5.1 Banking  
 
An active bank account is compulsory for each regist red cooperative. According to the 
chairpersons of all selected cooperatives, the Treasur r manages the financial matters of the 
cooperative. Table 4.8 shows that seven cooperatives kept less than R5000 in their bank 
accounts at the time of the survey, while three cooperatives kept between R5000 and R10000. 
All the chairpersons felt that the actual amounts of their bank balances were confidential and, 
hence, only the range of funds kept in their bank accounts was provided. 
 
Table 4.8: Range of funds kept in the bank by selected cooperatives, KwaZulu-Natal, 
2007. 
Cooperative type Range of funds kept in bank 
account (R) 
Vegetable cooperative 1 0 - 4999 
Vegetable cooperative 2 0 - 4999 
Vegetable cooperative 3 0 - 4999 
Vegetable cooperative 4 0 - 4999 
Vegetable cooperative 5 5000 - 10000 
Beef cooperative 0 - 4999 
Bakery cooperative 5000 - 10000 
Poultry cooperative 1 0 - 4999 
Poultry cooperative 2 5000 - 10000 
Poultry cooperative 3 0 - 4999 
 
Any surplus generated by vegetable cooperatives 1 and 3, the bakery cooperative and poultry 
cooperative 1 is first used to pay back loans from Ithala Bank. The remaining surplus is then 
used to purchase the required day-to-day production inputs before they distribute any surplus 






4.5.2 Turnover and distribution of net surplus 
 
Table 4.9 shows the amount of turnover (gross income), the trend in turnover generated by 
each selected cooperative in 2006/07 and the distribution of any surpluses among members. 
The bakery cooperative generated the highest turnove  per annum (R180000), followed by 
poultry cooperative 1 with R150000. The relatively high bakery turnover may be a result of 
the greater production generated with the use of advanced equipment for baking bread and 
other products, and a ready market for their product. The bakery cooperative not only supplies 
its neighbours but also receives large orders from local shops. Vegetable cooperative 3 had the 
least turnover per annum (R2300). 
 











Vegetable cooperative 1 26000 No change Equally 
Vegetable cooperative 2 6600 Increased Equally 
Vegetable cooperative 3 2300 Increased Equally 
Vegetable cooperative 4 5650 Increased Equally 
Vegetable cooperative 5 36000 Increased Equally 
Beef cooperative Not applicable 
since the 
cooperative is still 
breeding cattle 
until 2009 
Not yet applicable Not yet applicable 
Bakery cooperative 180000 Increased Equally 
Poultry cooperative 1 150000 Increased Equally 
Poultry cooperative 2 68000 Increased Equally 
Poultry cooperative 3 4800 Decreased Equally 
 
Seven of the chairpersons reported that the turnove f their enterprise had increased since 
establishment though most of it was used to repay the loan and purchase inputs. The 
chairpersons of poultry cooperative 3 and vegetable cooperative 1 reported that there has been 
a decrease and no change in the turnover of their enterprises, respectively, due to limited 






the interview. Any surplus generated by the selected cooperatives was distributed equally 
among members. Thus, as expected in a traditional cooperative, returns were not proportional 




The chairpersons of two selected cooperatives (vegetable cooperatives 4 and 5) mentioned that 
for growing their business they had considered joint ventures with larger food chain 
organisations (such as fruit and vegetable stores or Pick ‘n Pay for organic foods) to add value 
to their produce; e.g., through warehousing, processing, branding and labelling (see Table 
4.10). Joint ventures allow cooperatives to exploit economies of scale (Gripsrud et al., 2000).  
Table 4.10: Growth opportunities considered by selected cooperatives, KwaZulu-Natal, 
2007. 
 
Type of growth opportunity 
Number of cooperatives 
acknowledging factor 
Cooperatives considering joint venture only 2 
Cooperatives considering converting to investor-owned firm (IOF) 
only 4 
Cooperatives considering joint venturing and eventually converting to 
an IOF 3 
Cooperatives not considering either joint venture or converting to IOF 
as a growth opportunity 1 
 
 
According to Hardesty (2004), joint ventures may be th  only way cooperatives can afford to 
own part of an expensive facility or market a new product nationally. With regards to 
converting to investor-owned firms (IOFs), four chairpersons confirmed that they had 
considered eventually converting to an IOF once their cooperatives were well established. 
Only one cooperative (vegetable cooperative 2) had not considered either joint venturing or 





The Cooperative’s Act of 2005 states that an audit of the affairs of a cooperative must be 
conducted annually in respect of each financial year in order to ensure financial statements are 






2005). In addition, the auditing report should state whether the assets and facilities of a co-
operative are being properly managed and the operations of a cooperative are being conducted 
in accordance with cooperative principles (Governmet Gazette, 2005). All selected 
cooperatives had their books audited (either internally or externally) thereby revealing their 
willingness to promote good corporate governance. Internal auditing is an independent 
evaluation function established within an organisation o examine and evaluate its activities to 
improve the effectiveness of risk management, control and governance processes. External 
auditing, on the other hand, is a periodic examinatio  of the books of account and records of a 
company conducted by an independent third party (an auditor) to evaluate the efficiency, 
economy and effectiveness of the company’s internal control systems and business activities 
(Jackson and Stent, 2007). External auditing promotes transparency and, hence, accountability 
to investors (Lyne, 2008).  
 
According to Chorafas (2001), well-planned and prope ly structured auditing programmes are 
essential to effective risk management and adequate internal control systems for any 
organisation. In addition, effective internal and external audit programmes are a critical 
defence against fraud and provide vital information t  the board of directors about the 
effectiveness of internal control systems (Chorafas, 2001). Auditing allows cooperatives to 
take account of their financial business transactions, how much stock they acquired, how 
much they sold and to rectify any errors detected. Seven of the selected cooperatives carry out 
internal auditing while only three cooperatives useexternal auditors. External auditing is done 
by Ithala Bank whilst internal auditing is done by extension officers. All the selected 
cooperatives mentioned that they are audited at leas once a year.  
4.6 Government assistance needed by selected cooperatives  
 
Table 4.11 shows some of the assistance that the chairpersons said their cooperatives required 
in order to improve their cooperatives’ business performance. In addition, five of the selected 
cooperatives responded that they required bookkeeping training for management. Five of the 
cooperatives - vegetable cooperative 1, all three poultry cooperatives and the beef cooperative 
- required skills training on the production and maintenance of vegetables, poultry 
management, and cattle management and maintenance, respectively. Only vegetable 









































- Bookkeeping training 
for all members 
-Farm implements 
provision, e.g., tractor 




tunnel and pesticides. 






- Leadership course for 
management 
- Bookkeeping training 
for all members 
-Crop production 
training, from 
planting to harvesting 
- No assistance 
required 






-Leadership training for 
all members 
-Provision of farm 
equipment, e.g., 
tractor and irrigation 
scheme 
-Vegetable 
production and pest 











- Leadership training 
for all members 
- Bookkeeping training 
for management 




cooperatives by the 
KZNDAEA to ensure 
that cooperatives are 
operating well 
 
- Financial assistance 
for diversification 





- Cattle maintenance 
and management 
-Provision of farm 
equipment, e.g., 
tractor 
- Financial assistance 
for daily operations 





- Bookkeeping training 






to purchase baking 
equipment 




-Skills training on 
poultry production for 
all cooperative 
members 
- Bookkeeping training 






- Security for their 
chickens 
-Financial advice and 
investment 
- Financial assistance 
for growth 






- No assistance required -No assistance 
required 
- Financial assistance 
for building more 
chicken runs 




- Poultry management 
training 
- Bookkeeping training 
for all members 
-No assistance 
required 
- Financial assistance 
for building more 
poultry pens 










4.6.1 General management and leadership 
 
Chairpersons of the five selected vegetable cooperativ s indicated that they required training 
on the general leadership and management of their cooperative. The training is usually done 
by a FET College or KZNDAEA as extension support.  
 
4.6.2 Production capacity 
 
In terms of production, three of the five vegetable cooperatives required farm implements such 
as a tractor to till the land and an irrigation scheme in order to improve vegetable yields. The 
beef cooperative required a tractor to diversify into other enterprises such as vegetable 
production in order to generate funds required for daily operations. One poultry cooperative 
required support in the form of more poultry pens ad security fencing for their enterprise. In 
addition, vegetable cooperative 3 required skills training on vegetable crop production from 
planting to harvesting. The chairperson of vegetabl cooperative 5 stated that there was a need 
for post-harvest monitoring in order to evaluate if xtension support was used effectively and 
efficiently. The chairperson for vegetable cooperative 4 stated that they required government 
to assist with pest and disease control for their vgetables. 
 
4.6.3 Financial assistance and management 
 
With regards to financial management, nine of the cooperative chairpersons stated that they 
required financial assistance for various purposes such as erecting more vegetable tunnels, 
more poultry pens for the poultry cooperatives, to finance daily operations, and financial and 
investment training. Three of the chairpersons stated that they required some education on 
financial management and investment since they wish to expand their businesses into other 




Cooperatives need to develop a plan to address how t ey will react to the various strategies 
that competitors may use to retain their business (Harris, 2007). Chairpersons of six selected 
cooperatives stated that they did not have access to education and training on marketing 
research and development, which includes finding information on choosing the best product 






best price to sell their produce and how the cooperative should go about promoting their 











The main objective of cluster analysis is to identify homogeneous groups or clusters of 
variables in a multivariate data set (Everitt, 1980). In this chapter, cluster analysis is 
performed on variables to test for positive relationships hypothesised between cooperative 
performance indicators, institutional indicators and governance indicators.  
5.2 Cluster analysis 
 
The basic aim of cluster analysis is to find the “natural groupings”, if any, of a set of 
individuals (cases or variables). Whilst cluster analysis can be used in several ways, the kind 
of cluster analysis utilised in this research is a way to form similar sets of variables rather than 
similar sets of cooperatives (Chatfield and Collins, 1980). The purpose of the analysis is, 
therefore, to draw inferences about theoretical propositions and not about a population of 
cooperatives. In essence, cluster analysis aims to allocate a set of individuals/variables to a set 
of mutually exclusive groups such that the individuals/variables within a group are similar to 
one another while individuals/variables in different groups are dissimilar (Chatfield and 
Collins, 1980:212). Hierarchical clustering is appropriate for small samples (typically n < 250) 
and can also be applied to qualitative (dummy) variables (Garson, 2008). In this study, cluster 
analysis is used to test the proposition that good cooperative performance depends on good 
institutional arrangements and good governance. 
5.3 Institutional, governance and performance indicators 
 
Table 5.1 represents the variables used for the cluster analysis, their definitions, the constructs 
to which they relate and the relevant scores (0 or 1). Decisions regarding the desirability of 
these attributes were informed by the NIE literature (Williamson, 1985; North, 1990; Cook, 
1995; Kherallah and Kirsten, 2002). NIE is concerned with the social, economic and political 







Table 5.1: Indicator variables observed in the cooperative case studies. 
Variable  Definition of variables Score Empirical construct 
Surplus  
Is the cooperative generating a net surplus or 
price advantage for its members? 
Yes = 1, No = 0 
Lowequity Low levels of equity capital?   No = 1, Yes = 0 
Reliance 
Was the cooperative financed mainly with 
government grants/loans? 
No = 1, Yes = 0 
Lowasset Low levels of growth assets?  No = 1, Yes = 0 
Lossmem Loss of membership? No = 1, Yes = 0 
Skillstrain 
Did the cooperative members obtain skills 
training for the enterprise (e.g., poultry, 
vegetables)? 
Yes = 1, No = 0  









Non-members qualify for the same prices paid 
by/to members? 
No = 1, Yes = 0 
PropSurp 
Net surpluses are/will be distributed in 
proportion to individual equity contributions? 
Yes = 1, No = 0 
CapGains 
Members can buy shares that can appreciate in 
value? 
Yes = 1, No = 0 
Horizon 
New members pay par value to join the 
cooperative? 
No = 1, Yes = 0 
Influence 
Voting rights to elect directors are proportional 
to individual equity contributions? 
Yes = 1, No = 0 
Unity  Members share same investment preferences? Yes = 1, No = 0 
Labinput 
Members are rewarded according to their labour 
input? 
Yes = 1, No = 0 
Institutional indicators 
Election 
Directors duly nominated and elected at annual 
general meeting (AGM)? 
Yes = 1, No = 0 
Ballot Voting by secret ballot? Yes = 1, No = 0 
Audit Annual accounts subject to independent audit? Yes = 1, No = 0 
Lackinfo Audited accounts accessible by all members? Yes = 1, No = 0 
Notice Sufficient notice period for AGM? Yes = 1, No = 0 
Minutes Minutes of AGM available to all members? Yes = 1, No = 0 
Education Management of the cooperative is trained? Yes = 1, No = 0 
Governance indicators 
 
Seven variables, presented in Table 5.1, were selected as indicators of enterprise performance. 
These variables are surplus, lowequity, reliance, lowasset, lossmem, skillstrain and lackmark. 
Surplus reveals the ability of the business to reward members. The variables lowequity and 






lenders or investors; hence, the enterprises are constrained to raising their capital through 
government donations and loans. Low equity and debthave implications for the availability of 
growth assets for these cooperatives (lowasset). From the members’ perspective, performance 
is measured by the variables surplus, lossmem and skillstrain. There has been a loss of 
members (lossmem) from the majority of the study cooperatives since th y registered due to 
financial constraints, which resulted in some members losing hope, and some members 
misusing cooperatives to pursue political goals. Smallholder cooperatives often face a number 
of barriers, e.g., transport constraints to accessing the market for their produce (Magingxa and 
Kamara, 2003). Hence, the availability of a market (lackmark) and transport for cooperatives’ 
produce is crucial to the overall performance of cooperatives.  
 
Seven variables, presented in Table 5.1, were selected as institutional indicators. These 
variables are openmem, propsurp, capgains, horizon, influence, unity and labinput. Although 
cooperative membership is open to new members, openmem reflects that non-members qualify 
for the same prices paid to/by existing members, so creating an external free-rider problem. As 
expected in a TC, returns are not proportional to individual investment (propsurp). In TCs 
shares are non-transferable and non-appreciable (capgains) creating a disincentive for 
members to invest (Chaddad and Cook, 2004). The variables horizon and unity suggest the 
possibility of free-rider problems since the gains from cooperative action can be accessed by 
individuals that did not fully invest in developing the gains, whether those individuals are 
new(er) members or non-members. In TCs all members of a cooperative have equal voting 
power (one-member, one-vote). Influence suggests that members are discouraged from 
investing because their voting rights are not propotional to their individual equity 
contributions. Failure of cooperatives to reward memb rs according to their labour input 
(labinput) creates an incentive for some members to shirk. 
 
Seven variables, presented in Table 5.1, were selected as indicators of governance. These 
variables are election, ballot, audit, lackinfo, notice, minutes and education. The variables 
election and ballot reveal the possibility of institutional flaws of TCs, leading to an influence 
problem (Cook, 1995). According to the Cooperatives Act of 2005, an audit (audit) of the 
affairs of a cooperative must be conducted annually to ensure that financial statements are 






cooperatives are required to provide a report on whether their assets and facilities are being 
properly managed and the operations of a cooperativ re being conducted in accordance with 
cooperative principles. They should also pr vide information on any other matter the auditors 
are required to report on in terms of a cooperative’s constitution (Government Gazette, 2005). 
Positive scores on the variables audit, lackinfo, notice and minutes indicate that provisions for 
good governance stipulated bythe Cooperatives Act of 2005 have, in fact, been imple ented. 
Access to necessary skills for members and education of management (skillstrain and 
education) are expected to have positive implications for the ability of members to improve 
overall performance of their cooperative (Ortmann ad King, 2007a).  
 
Ranking the cooperatives according to the seven indicators of performance (listed in Table 
5.1) distinguishes the vegetable cooperatives 3, 4 and 5, and the poultry cooperatives 2 and 3 
as better performers (since they contain the most god characteristics or positive attributes of 
performance) and vegetable cooperatives 1 and 2 as the worst performers (since they contain 
the least number of positive attributes of performance). The ranking is presented in Table 5.2. 
Cooperative scores on institutional and governance i dicators are presented in Appendices 2 
and 3, respectively. 
Table 5.2: Ranking of cooperative case studies according to performance 
indicators, KwaZulu-Natal, 2007. 




























































Vegetable cooperative 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 4 1 
Vegetable cooperative 4 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 1 
Vegetable cooperative 5 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 4 1 
Poultry cooperative 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 1 
Poultry cooperative 3 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 4 1 
Poultry cooperative 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 6 
Bakery cooperative 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 6 
Beef cooperative 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 8 
Vegetable cooperative 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 9 
Vegetable cooperative 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 
Notes: *For all enterprise performance variables, 1 represents the presence of a positive attribute or go d 






5.4 Cluster analysis of variables 
 
In this study, cluster analysis was applied to the 21 indicators representing the three constructs 
in the empirical model: good performance, good institutions and good governance indicators 
(Table 5.3). The specific aim of the analysis was to identify ‘natural groupings’ of these 21 
variables. This was done by minimising the squared Euclidean distance within a decreasing 
number of clusters containing an increasing number of positively related variables. In this 
way, a relatively small number of clusters or naturl groupings can be identified, each 
containing a reasonably homogenous group of variables. The conceptual model of cooperative 
performance (Figure 2.1) proposed in this study predicts that the ‘natural groupings’ identified 
by cluster analysis should contain a healthy mix of variables drawn from each of the different 
constructs because positive relationships are expected between sound institutional 
arrangements, good governance and good enterprise performance. In other words, the natural 
groupings detected through cluster analysis should not coincide with the empirical 
constructs, as this would indicate the absence of strong positive relationships between the 
empirical constructs. 
 
5.5 Interpretation of results  
 
Cluster analysis revealed two distinct natural groupings or clusters of variables. The mean 
Euclidean distance within clusters increases markedly from 2.318 to 5.057 when the number 
of clusters diminishes from two to one, indicating a sudden loss of homogeneity within the 
group of variables when fewer than two clusters are retained (Table 5). The cluster analysis 
undertaken in this study shows that institutional and governance variables affect performance 
in quite distinct ways as there is little mixing of these constructs in the clusters. There is little 
overlap between positive institutional and governance i dicators, which is not consistent with 
the theoretical model illustrated by Figure 2.1. Perhaps this is because the cooperatives 
complied with the good governance requirements of the new Cooperatives Act and also with 
its bad institutional arrangements. Nevertheless, positive indicators of good institutional 
arrangements are correlated with the positive indicators of good performance captured in 
Cluster 1. Similarly, the positive indicators of good governance are correlated with the 







Table 5.3: Inter-relationships between performance, institutional and governance 
indicators, selected smallholder cooperatives, KwaZulu-Natal, 2007. 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
























































































Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
Lowequity               
Reliance                
Lowasset               
Lossmem                
Surplus               
Skillstrain               
Lackmark               
Key 
Variables measuring institutional arrangements  
Variables measuring governance problems   
 
5.5.1 Cluster 1 
 
Cluster 1 identifies positive relationships between the four performance indicators lowequity, 
reliance, lowasset and lossmem; six institutional variables openmem, propsurp, capgains, 
horizon, influence and unity; and two governance indicators ballot and education. Cluster 1 
linked the subset of performance indicators that measure the ‘equity capital problem’ to 
institutional arrangements that discourage investmen . Openmem indicates an external free-
rider problem, which occurs when current members and non-members use resources for their 
individual benefit but property rights are not sufficiently well defined to ensure that current 
members or non-members bear the full costs of theiract ons and/or receive the full benefits 
they create. Propsurp indicates an internal free-rider problem, which arises when members of 
the cooperative are rewarded for patronage even if they invest very little in the cooperative. 
Capgains indicates a ‘portfolio problem’ because members of a TC cannot transact equity 
shares at their market value. Horizon indicates members’ disincentive to invest since shares in 
a traditional cooperative cannot appreciate in value, so new members’ free ride on the 
investments and efforts made by existing members without paying the full price for their 






cooperative’s investment decisions when voting power is not proportional to individual 
investment. Where benefit and voting rights are alloc ted in proportion to individual member 
investment, the investment and the influence problems would be eliminated. The institutional 
variable unity indicates that differing members’ goals negatively impacts cooperative 
performance According to Pischke and Rouse (2004), harmonising members’ interests and the 
cooperative’s interests is the key to effective capitalisation. 
 
Ballot indicates governance problems since voting was conducted by show of hands as 
opposed to voting by secret ballot in all selected cooperatives. A simple show of hands can 
bias the election of directors in favour of individuals with power rather than competency. A 
positive score on the governance variable, education, links strongly to positive scores on the 
institutional indicators. That is, education is positively correlated to good institutional 
arrangements suggesting that education is a prerequisite for the application of good institutions 
(‘rules of the game’).  
 
5.5.2 Cluster 2 
 
This cluster indicates positive relationships betwen the three performance variables surplus, 
skillstrain and lackmark; one institutional variable labinput; and five governance variables 
election, audit, lackinfo, notice and minutes. Labinput indicates that failure to provide equal 
work effort for an equal share of profit creates a ‘labour’ free-rider problem that discourages 
labour effort. This problem could sink the cooperative long before other institutional problems 
become evident.  
 
In the main, Cluster 2 highlights positive links betw en indicators of good governance 
(election, audit, lackinfo, notice and minutes) and good financial, training and marketing 
performance in the selected cooperatives. Cooperativ s hat performed well on these measures 
tended to conduct regular elections for directors, had their books audited (either internally or 
externally), notified members of meetings, kept minutes and made their records available to all 









CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This study indicates that the selected smallholder cooperatives are performing poorly and rely 
on government grants and donations for their sustainabil ty. All of the selected cooperatives 
obtained at least part of their initial capital from the government. Descriptive results suggest 
that smallholder cooperative members do not fully understand the cooperative principles and 
have high expectations of possible benefits. This may be due to the fact that some members 
joined cooperatives in order to access government grants and some to achieve their political 
objectives.  
 
Results of a cluster analysis of variables measuring three constructs (comprising performance, 
institutional and governance indicators) suggest that t e performance of the 10 selected 
smallholder cooperatives was influenced by institutional and governance problems. 
Institutional problems, which stem from poorly defin d property rights in traditional 
cooperatives, give rise to low levels of equity and debt capital, reliance on government 
funding, low levels of investment, and subsequent loss of members. With respect to 
governance problems, the results suggest that they are strongly linked with the absence of a 
secret ballot system, low levels of education, lack of production and management skills 
training, weak marketing arrangements and consequent low returns to members as patrons or 
investors. Good governance of organisations is characte ised by discipline, transparency, 
independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness and social responsibility.  
 
To promote good institutions and good governance among smallholder cooperatives in South 
Africa may require amendments to the Cooperatives Act of 2005. Current government support 
for cooperatives provides an incentive for businesses to compromise their institutional 
arrangements in order to access financial and extension support services. The findings of this 
study call into question the policy of giving support to cooperatives over other forms of 
business organisations that smallholders could use to increase their income and wealth. It is 
recommended that government support for cooperatives be extended to include other types of 
cooperative-styled businesses such as new generation cooperatives. Property rights need to be 
clearly defined to ensure that current members or non-members bear the full costs of their 






to provide flexibility to reward member investment i  the cooperative. With regards to 
egalitarian voting rights, it is recommended that the Cooperatives Act of 2005 be amended to 
allow cooperatives flexibility to provide members with voting rights in proportion to their 
patronage, investment or shareholding.  
 
In view of the history, development, problems experienced, and the fact that several large-
scale cooperatives in South Africa have converted to investor owned firms, the question 
remains whether a traditional cooperative is the appro riate organisational form for emerging 
farmers in South Africa to use. Further research is still required to test the study’s findings 
over a longer period of time using a larger and more representative sample of cooperatives. 
Currently, the government issues loans and grants to cooperatives registered under the 
Cooperatives Act of 2005. The study also recommends that further research be conducted on 
the criteria used to assess the creditworthiness and feasibility of smallholder agricultural 
cooperatives. Though this study cannot be generalisd for the whole of KZN, it provides an 
entry point for government and other policy makers to revise policies such as the Cooperatives 
Act of 2005 and implement policy measures suitable for the development of appropriate 
organisations for smallholder groups.  
 
This study has been based on smallholder production o peratives producing and marketing 
various agricultural products in KZN. Further research could focus on smallholder 
cooperatives similar in product type other than their institutional arrangements. Differences in 
performance could then be attributed to differences in institutional arrangements (and not to 
differences in, say, product type). Finally, the cases selected for study did not display much 
variation on the institutional and governance variables thought to influence cooperative 
performance. Hence, future studies of this type need more a priori information about the 









The history of cooperatives dates back more than 160 years (e.g., the Rochdale Equitable 
Pioneers’ Society consumer cooperative was established in England in 1844). Smallholder 
cooperatives have significant economic incentives such as achieving more favourable prices, 
enhancing incomes and improving the viability of business activities of their members. They 
can be important in promoting employment, human welfar , and political stability in less 
developed countries.  
 
The 2005/06 report of the South African (SA) Registrar of Cooperatives recorded a 79% 
increase in the number of registered agricultural cooperatives from 256 in 2001 to 459 in 
2004. With regards to KZN, 57 new agricultural cooperatives registered in 2005. Despite these 
positive statistics, reports have indicated that it is difficult to ascertain the actual number of 
active and thriving registered cooperatives. Some of the smallholder cooperatives have 
registered but are not operating at all. Some of the contributory factors have been associated 
with lack of proper co-ordination between cooperative members; poor financial and 
institutional support; lack of markets; no mentorship, monitoring and evaluation programmes; 
and a lack of entrepreneurial skills.  
 
Past research on poor-performing and failed cooperativ s in former homelands of South Africa 
suggest that members did not clearly understand the purpose of a cooperative, its functions 
and what members’ rights are. Some studies have sugge ted that poor performance of 
cooperatives is also caused by lack of membership identity with the cooperatives; lack of 
understanding of members’ roles; the subsistence nature of cooperatives in the less-developed 
areas; and failure to involve cooperative members in decision making. In addition, failure of 
cooperatives to compete with other businesses; inability of cooperatives to keep adequate 
input stock; inability of cooperatives to provide sufficient credit; inability of members to 
dismiss inefficient management; and failure to provide transport for delivery for members’ 
purchases were other contributory factors. Weak institutions and authoritative management 






This study presents an overview of the factors influencing the performance of 10 selected 
smallholder farmer cooperatives (case studies) in KZN. The broad objective of this study aims 
to gain a better understanding of the characteristics of these cooperatives, and to identify 
institutional and governance constraints affecting cooperative performance through an in-
depth analysis of these 10 case studies. The study is based on work by Cook (1995) and Cook 
and IIiopoulos (2000) that highlights the importance of resolving institutional and governance 
problems in traditional cooperatives, and ways in which South Africa’s cooperative legislation 
could be amended to mitigate these problems (Lyne and Collins, 2008). 
 
The democratic South African government deemed the Cooperatives Act of 1981 to be 
unsuitable for the overall development of cooperatives because it focused on larger and 
commercial agricultural cooperatives. Concerns were expressed that it neither provided an 
adequate definition of a cooperative, nor did it explicitly enforce compliance with cooperative 
principles. The new Cooperatives Act (No. 14 of 2005) aimed at providing a legal 
environment conducive for cooperative development and to promote greater participation of 
the previously disadvantaged persons who were not supported by preceding Cooperative Acts. 
This new Act recognises the cooperative values (such as self-help, self-reliance, self-
responsibility, and democracy), and argues that a viable, autonomous, self-reliant and self-
sustaining cooperative movement is important for the economic and social development of the 
country, particularly among the previously disadvantaged people.  
 
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) framework considers that institutions (“rules of the 
game”) have an influence on individual and firm behaviour and, therefore, on outcomes such 
as economic performance, efficiency, economic growth and development. The basic idea of 
NIE is that the success of a market system depends upon the institutions to facilitate efficient 
private transactions. The recognition of institutions as important determinants of economic 
efficiency has created the basis for several applications of NIE to cooperatives. Traditional 
cooperatives are fraught with institutional problems such as free-rider, horizon, portfolio, 
control and influence-cost problems. The nature and extent of these problems in any setting is 







This study was based on 10 smallholder cooperatives in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) that were 
selected, with the assistance of extension officers of the KZN Department of Agriculture and 
Environmental Affairs (KZNDAEA), to serve as detailed case studies. The survey was 
conducted during October and November 2007. Five of the cooperatives produce and market 
vegetables, three produce and sell poultry products, one is a beef production cooperative and 
one a bakery cooperative. Five of the selected cooperatives were from the EThekwini District, 
three from Msunduzi District and two from Camperdown District in KZN. Data were collected 
from the selected cooperatives using a structured questionnaire and in-depth interviews with 
the chairpersons, management committee and other members of the selected cooperatives. The 
data were analysed using descriptive and cluster analyses. The basic aim of cluster analysis is 
to find the “natural groupings” (clusters), if any, of a set of individuals (variables). In this 
study, cluster analysis of institutional, governance and performance variables was adopted to 
test for positive relationships hypothesised between cooperative performance, institutional 
arrangements and governance, and to identify homogeneous groups or clusters of variables in 
a multivariate data set.  
 
Survey results indicate that members of the selected ooperatives generally do not understand 
the guiding principles of a cooperative. They have high expectations of the potential benefits 
of establishing a cooperative which poses institutional and governance problems. The results 
of a cluster analysis of variables measuring three constructs (comprising performance, 
institutional and governance indicators) suggest that t e performance of the 10 selected 
smallholder cooperatives was influenced by institutional and governance problems. The 
findings suggest that institutional problems in traditional cooperatives stem from ill-defined 
property rights which in turn give rise to low levels of equity and debt capital, reliance on 
government funding, low levels of investment, and subsequent loss of members. On the other 
hand, governance problems stem from an open ballot ( bsence of secret ballot), low levels of 
education, lack of production and management skills training, weak marketing arrangements 
and consequent low returns to members as patrons or investors. Good governance of 
organisations promotes discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility, 







To promote good institutions and good governance among smallholder cooperatives in South 
Africa may require amendments to the Cooperatives Act of 2005. Smallholder cooperatives 
under current government support have an incentive to compromise their institutional 
arrangements in order to access financial and extension support services. The findings of this 
study call into question the policy of giving support to cooperatives over other forms of 
business organisations that smallholders could use to increase their income and wealth. It is 
recommended that government support for cooperatives be extended to include other types of 
cooperative styled businesses such as new generation cooperatives. Many of these cooperative 
businesses may need to restructure as alternative types of businesses by clearly defining 
property rights in their constitutions to ensure that current members or non-members bear the 
full costs/benefits of their investments. Hence, the Act could be revised to provide flexibility 
to reward member investment in the cooperative.  
 
This study examined smallholder cooperatives producing and marketing various agricultural 
products in KZN. Unfortunately, the cases selected for study did not display much variation on 
the institutional and governance variables thought to influence cooperative performance. 
Future studies of this type need more a priori information about the cooperatives selected for 
case study to ensure sufficient variation on the variables used to test theoretical propositions. 
In addition, future research could also focus on smallholder cooperatives similar in product 
type other than their institutional arrangements. Thus, differences in performance could then 
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Appendix 1: Principles of cooperatives 
 
Principle Role 
Voluntary and Open 
Membership  
 
Cooperatives are voluntary, open to all persons who are capable of 
using their services and willing to accept the respon ibilities of 






Cooperatives are democratic organizations controlled by their members 
who actively participate in setting policies and making decisions. The 
elected representatives are accountable to the membership. In primary 






Members contribute equitably to, and democratically control, the 
capital of their cooperative. At least part of that c pital is usually the 
common property of the cooperative. Members usually receive limited 
compensation, if any, on capital subscribed as a conditi n of 
membership. Members allocate surpluses for any or all f the following 
purposes: developing the cooperative, part of the surplus is set aside as 
reserves and not distributed to members; benefiting members in 
proportion to their transactions with the cooperative; and supporting 





Cooperatives are autonomous, self-help organizations c trolled by 
their members. If they enter into agreements with other organizations, 
including governments, or raise capital from external sources, they do 
so on terms that ensure democratic control by theirm mbers and 
maintaining their cooperative autonomy. 
 
Education, Training 
and Information  
 
Cooperatives provide education and training for their members, elected 
representatives, managers, and employees so that they can contribute 
effectively to the development of their cooperatives. Cooperatives 
inform the general public, particularly young people and opinion 





Cooperatives serve their members most effectively and strengthen the 






While focusing on members’ needs, cooperatives work together in 
order to sustain community development through policies approved by 
their members. 






Appendix 2: Cooperative scores on institutional indicators 
 








































0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Vegetable 
cooperative 2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Vegetable 
cooperative 3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Vegetable 
cooperative 4 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Vegetable 
cooperative 5 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Beef cooperative 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Bakery 
cooperative 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Poultry 
cooperative 1 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Poultry 
cooperative 2 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Poultry 
cooperative 3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Notes: *For all enterprise institutional variables, 1 represents the presence of a positive 







Appendix 3: Cooperative scores on governance indicators 
 






































1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Vegetable 
cooperative 2 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Vegetable 
cooperative 3 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Vegetable 
cooperative 4 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Vegetable 
cooperative 5 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Beef cooperative 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Bakery 
cooperative 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Poultry 
cooperative 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Poultry 
cooperative 2 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Poultry 
cooperative 3 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Notes: *For all enterprise governance variables, 1 represents the presence of a positive 
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FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PERFORMANCE OF SELECTED SMA LLHOLDER 
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES IN KWAZULU-NATAL 
 
 
YOUR SURVEY RESPONSES WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDE NTIAL. 
 




Name of the Cooperative ………………………………………………..... 
Total Membership………………………………………………………… 
          Location ……………………………………..…………………………...... 
Name and position of the respondent……………………………………. 
                                                         …………………………………….. 
 
 




1. When did your cooperative start? dd/mm/yyyy            
 





















4a). Are the founding members still part of your cooperative YES             NO  
 
b). If NO, why have they left? 
 
1. Financial crisis                 2. To start own cooperative                3. Social conflict 
 






















6a). Has this vision changed since the cooperative s arted?    YES                NO   
 
 
b). If YES, what has changed and what caused the change of the vision?  







        















Registration and operations  
 
8. What benefits were / are available for registered cooperatives? (for example, funding, 
external support, extension support, etc)? 
 















9. How would you categorise your cooperative? 
 
1. Input supply cooperative 
 
2. Marketing cooperative 
 
3. Producer cooperative 
 
 















11. Input supply cooperative 
If your cooperative focuses mainly on supplying farm inputs, what inputs do you sell? 
 








5. Other (specify) 
 
 
12. Marketing cooperative 
If your cooperative focuses mainly on selling agricultural products which products do you 
sell? 








5. Other (specify)  
 
 
13. Producer cooperative  
What are the main products produced by your members  
 








5. Other (specify)  
 
 
14a). Post harvest processing 
Does your cooperative carry out some value-adding activity after harvesting (post-harvest 
processing)? 
 















15. What is the target market for your products? 
 
1. Local shops     2. Neighbours              3. Monthly pensioners 
 
4. Nearest big cities  5. Other (specify)   
 
 
b) Rank the various sources of economic support listed below in order of the support your 
cooperative gains from them, where: 
5 = absolute support 
4 = most support 
3 = moderate support 
2 = least support 
1 = no support at all 
 
Please circle the relevant number 
 
Local shops                            5 4   3   2    1 
Neighbours                            5   4   3   2    1 
Monthly pensioners               5  4   3    2   1 
Nearest big cities                   5   4   3    2   1 
Other                                     5   4   3    2   1 
 
 
16. What was the initial capital investment in your cooperative when you started operating? 
 
        
 
 
17a). Where did you get the capital? 
      Member’s equity                                         Amount       
 
      Donations from Government                    Amount                     
 
      Donations from NGO’s                               Amount      
 























b) What was the range of each member’s investment / quity?  
 
 
18. How are you currently financing your operations?  
     Members’ equity                             
    
    Grants from Government           
 
    Credit from Government           
 
    Donations from NGO’s              
 
    Bank loans                                  
  




SECTION B  
 
Structure and Organisation of the Cooperative  
 




Male Female  > 40 years   < 40 years 
    
    
 
 
2. How has your total membership changed over the past years?            












   







3. How has the composition of membership changed since registration, with respect to gender?  
 
Gender Increased  Decreased  
Males   
Females    
 
4. What is the size of the Management Committee? 
      
 
5. What is the management structure of your cooperativ  (use diagram if possible)?  



















     
7. What is the name of the chairperson? 
 
      
 
 
8. What is his/her gender, age and highest education qualification? 
    Gender                        Age                Qualification  
 
 
9. What is the minimum experience and business skills required for the Chairperson in terms 








   






10. What is the minimum experience and business skill  required for the Manager in terms of 








11. Do they go through formal/informal training on leadership or management?  
                                               
              Formal                                    Informal 
 
 
12. How was the Leadership of the cooperative chosen? 
      Appointment                      Elections                 Other (specify) 
 
 
13. What is the length of tenure in office of members of the Management Committee? 
 
        
 
     










15. How many times per year does the cooperative management hold general meetings?  




16. Does each cooperative member get a copy of the minutes of previous management 
meetings? 
 
 YES                                       NO   
 
 



















18. Who drafted the initial constitution? 






19a). Do you have access to the cooperative constitution? 
  YES                      NO   
 
b). Do you understand what the cooperative constitution entails? 
 YES                          NO   
 
 
20. When was the last constitution last amended, an why? 








21. How often are elections for directors held? 




22a). How are these elections held? 
 











   
   
  
  












1. Does your cooperative have a bank account? YES                 NO  
 
 
2. Does your bank offer credit / allow overdraft?  YES                  NO  
 
3. What range of funds do you keep in your account? 
 
     R5000-R10000                     R10000-R20000                   R20000+  
 
4. How many signatories do you have?               
 
5a). Have you ever borrowed money from your bank in the past? YES                   NO               
 
b) If YES, how much was the loan, the interest ratecharged, and the payback period?   
            





Investment and equity 
 





7. What is the value of your debt and equity held by the cooperative at present?  
 
Total Debt (loan, any short and long-term debt)                                                                
 
Equity (shareholders capital) 
 
 
8a). Has the cooperative got bank overdraft facilities? 
 
 YES                                NO           
 
b). If YES, does the cooperative make regular use of this bank overdraft facility? 
  
YES                        NO 
  
  
   
 
 
















9.  Has the cooperative ever shown a profit? 
 
 YES                                     NO    
 
10. How is your surplus distributed?  
 







11. Patronage (volume of business the members do with the cooperative)   
Is most of your cooperative business conducted with? 
 
a) A small group of relatively large farmers  
 
b) A large group of small farmers    
 
 
12a) Do you charge a par value for shares to new members? 
 
YES       NO 
 
 









13) What is the cooperative’s net asset value (i.e., assets minus liabilities) in the balance 


















14a). Does the cooperative redeem the shares of leaving members? 
 
 YES                               NO         
 
b.)If YES, is it at par value?  
 
 YES                      NO                
 
 
15. What have you done to encourage existing and new m mber investment? (e.g., change 










16. Who manages the financial matters of the cooperativ ?   
                                                   
       Financial manager            Other (specify) 
 
 
17. What type of financial audits does the cooperative have? 
                      
            
   Internal    External 
 
 
18. When was the last auditing report produced?    
19a). Have you ever experienced a problem of embezzlement (misuse) of funds?     
       
      YES                    NO  
 
 
b). If YES, how much did you lose and how did you deal with the issue?  






















20. On average, what is the cooperative’s total turnover (gross income) from all enterprises per 
annum?  





21. What is the turnover for each enterprise your coperative is involved in, and how has it 
changed over the past?   
 
Enterprise Turnover (R) 
 
Trend (increased, decreased, 
no change) 
1.   
2.   
3.   
4.   
5.   
 
 
22. Where do you get advice on investment opportunities?  
 






23. List the organisations (Private, NGO`s and Governm nt departments) who have or are 





Type of assistance / support 















24a). Suppose your cooperative is considering expanding the business. How would your 
planned investment be financed? 
 
1. Member equity 
 
2. Sale of shares (non-redeemable) 
 
3. Partnership with an external investor 
 












25a). Has the cooperative ever considered working together with another organisation (joint 
venture) to add value to produce through warehousing, processing, branding and labeling? 
 
 YES                              NO   
 
b) If YES, how have you planned to achieve this, and reason for the chosen criteria? 
 
1. Joint venture through Equity partner   
 
 
2. Contract relationship                               
 



















26. Have you considered converting your cooperative to an investor-owned firm (e.g., new 
generation cooperative, private company)? 
 














































31. What type of assistance do you need to improve the following areas in your cooperative, 
and where do you think you can get such assistance?  
 















































33. What do you think the Government could do to improve the performance of smallholder 









34. What do you think are the major causes of failure for smallholder farmers’ cooperatives in 


















            THANK YOU FOR YOUR PATIENCE AND PARTICIPATION 
 
 
 
 
 
